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ARTICLES
ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE INTEGRATION OF LAW AND
FINANCE: THE IMPACT OF VOLATILITY SPIKES
Edward G. Fox,* Merritt B. Fox,** and Ronald J. Gilson***
The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis raised puzzles important for
understanding how the capital market prices common stocks and in
turn, for the intersection between law and ﬁnance. During the crisis,
there was a dramatic ﬁve-fold spike, across all industries, in “idiosyncratic risk”—the volatility of individual-ﬁrm share prices after
adjustment for movements in the market as a whole.
This phenomenon is not limited to the most recent ﬁnancial crisis.
This Article uses an empirical review to show that a dramatic spike in
idiosyncratic risk has occurred with every major downturn from the
1920s through the recent ﬁnancial crisis. It canvasses three possible
explanations for this phenomenon. Thereafter, this Article explores the
implications of these crisis-induced volatility spikes for certain legal
issues that depend analytically on valuation methodology and hence are
affected by volatility: using event studies to determine materiality and
loss causation in fraud-on-the-market securities litigation, determining
materiality in cases involving claims of both insider trading and
misstatements or omissions in registered public offerings, and determining the extent of deference given to a corporate board that rejects an
acquisition offer at a premium above the pre-offer market price.
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**. Michael E. Patterson Professor of Law, NASDAQ Professor for the Law and
Economics of Capital Markets, Columbia Law School.
***. Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law School, Meyers Professor of
Law and Business Emeritus, Stanford Law School and European Corporate Governance
Institute.
The authors wish to thank Ian Ayres, Allen Ferrell, Zohar Goshen, Joseph McCahery,
Andrew Roper, David Tabak, Mark Weinstein, and participants at the following workshops
and conferences for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article: American Law and
Economics Association 2011 Annual Conference; Madrid Autonomous School of Law
Faculty Workshop; Universitat Pompeu Fabra Law School Faculty Workshop, Barcelona;
Columbia Law School Faculty Workshop; University of Tokyo Law Faculty Workshop;
Vanderbilt University/Istanbul Bilgi University Conference on International Corporate
Law; Bank of Japan Research Institute Law and Economics Seminar; FGV-Sao Paolo Law
School Global Alliance Workshop; and the Yale Law School Law and Economics
Workshop.

325

326

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:325

This analysis shows that the conventional use of event studies
during periods of economic-crisis-induced volatility spikes results in
understating the number of occasions when a corporate misstatement
can be shown to have had a meaningful impact on a ﬁrm’s stock price.
Relatedly, the analysis suggests that during crisis times, insiders have
substantially more opportunities to proﬁt from trading on the nonpublic
information that they possess and issuers conducting offerings have
more opportunities to sell securities at an inﬂated price. Analysis shows
that trying to cure this problem by lowering the standard of what is
considered statistically signiﬁcant is as likely to be socially harmful as
socially beneﬁcial. These conclusions counsel that the best response to
the reduced effectiveness of private litigation as a deterrent to securities
law violations during crisis times is to provide additional resources to
SEC enforcement. Lastly, with respect to Delaware courts’ recognition of
“substantive coercion” as a justiﬁcation for target-corporation deployment of takeover defenses—arguably a dubious justiﬁcation in normal
times—crisis-induced idiosyncratic-risk spikes provide an unusually
plausible claim that target shareholders may indeed make a mistake in
tendering into a hostile offer. Analysis of the timing of the spikes in
recent cases, however, shows that the claim is tenuous even in these
circumstances.
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 327
I. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD...................................................................... 333
A. The 2008 to 2009 Financial Crisis .............................................. 333
B. Looking Back over Eight Decades ............................................. 335
C. Sectoral Analysis.......................................................................... 337
D. The Effects of Leverage .............................................................. 338
II. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS ..................................................................... 340
A. Current News Becomes Relatively More Important.................. 341
B. Information Concerning Quality of Management Becomes
More Important .......................................................................... 344
C. Model Failure: Ignorance Concerning What Facts Are Relevant
to Begin with ............................................................................... 344
III. THE EFFECTS ON EVENT STUDIES OF CRISIS-INDUCED SPIKES IN
IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY ................................................................. 346
A. Event Study Basics....................................................................... 347
1. Determining the Market-Adjusted Price Change. ............. 347
2. Judging the Market-Adjusted Price Change Against Its
Historical Volatility .............................................................. 349
B. Type I and Type II Errors in the Use of Event Studies for
Securities Litigation .................................................................... 352
1. The Magnitude of Type I and Type II Errors in Normal
Times Using a 95% Conﬁdence Level................................ 355

2016]

IMPACT OF VOLATILITY SPIKES

327

2. Type I and II Errors in Periods of Crisis-Induced, High
Idiosyncratic Risk................................................................. 357
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CRISIS-INDUCED SPIKES
IN IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK ........................................................................ 361
A. Fraud-on-the-Market Shareholder Class Actions: Establishing
Causation and Materiality........................................................... 362
1. Fraud-on-the-Market Actions and the Importance of the
Misstatement’s Effect on Price............................................ 364
2. The Use of an Event Study to Establish that a Corrective
Disclosure Has Had a Negative Impact on Price ............... 366
3. The Implications of Increased Idiosyncratic Risk for the Use
of Event Studies in Fraud-on-the-Market Suits................... 372
B. Establishing Materiality in Other Securities Law Contexts....... 393
1. Insider Trading.................................................................... 393
2. Materiality Under Section 11 of the Securities Act............ 395
C. Judicial Deference to Board Rejections of Premium Acquisition
Offers and Substantive Coercion ............................................... 397
1. A Brief Review of the Evolution of Delaware
Takeover Law ....................................................................... 398
2. Substantive Coercion and Crisis-Induced Spikes in
Idiosyncratic Risk................................................................. 401
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 407
INTRODUCTION
Financial economics has become ever more integrated into
corporate and securities law, a trend that started decades prior to the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 to 2009.1 This is as it should be. Corporate and
securities law is, at its core, about valuation. Investors provide to a
corporation the funds with which it acquires real assets. The investors
1. The interaction of corporate law and ﬁnance began in earnest with Michael
Jensen and William Meckling’s seminal article on the agency costs at the heart of public
corporations. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976); see also
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in The
Anatomy of Corporate Law 21 (R. Kraakman et al., eds. 2004) (discussing centrality of
agency theory to structure of corporate law). A series of inﬂuential articles linking the
legal system to corporate ﬁnance and the structure of capital markets further evidences
how law and ﬁnance came to be linked. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-deSilanes, Andrei Shliefer & Robert W. Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. Pol. Econ. 1113,
1114–16 (1998) (presenting cross-country study of links between investor legal protection
and development of strong capital markets). For an example of current scholarship that is
shaped by the intersection of law and ﬁnance, see Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz,
Corporate Control and Credible Commitment, 43 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 119, 121 (2015)
(analyzing controlling shareholders’ extraction of private beneﬁts of control in corporateﬁnance terms).
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receive in return ﬁnancial claims (securities) on the corporation’s future
cash ﬂows. The size of these future cash ﬂows then depends importantly
on management’s choice of what real assets to acquire and how well
these assets are managed over time. The capital market’s pricing of the
ﬁnancial claims acquired by investors is in effect a valuation of these
future cash ﬂows.2 Corporate law provides a framework within which a
ﬁrm’s managers make these investment and operating decisions. Properly
designed, this legal framework helps spur management to choose and
deploy assets in ways that maximize the value of the ﬁrm’s expected
future cash ﬂows. The framework’s effectiveness, however, depends in
part on the precision with which the capital market prices these ﬁnancial
assets.3 Securities law can enhance price accuracy, for example, by
mandating that corporations disclose certain information and by regulating the workings of the securities markets and the behavior of those
who trade in them.4 The better corporate and securities law perform
these tasks, the more valuable the corporation’s underlying business and
correspondingly, the ﬁnancial claims that the corporation issues.5
The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis raised many questions for ﬁnancial
economics and ﬁnancial regulation.6 Relatively unappreciated so far,
however, are the puzzles the crisis poses for understanding how the
capital market prices common stocks and in turn, for the intersection
between law and ﬁnance. During the crisis, there was a dramatic spike,

2. See Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers & Franklin Allen, Principles of
Corporate Finance 80 (11th ed. 2014) (deﬁning market value of debt and equity securities
as discounted present value of those securities’ future cash ﬂows).
3. See Merritt B. Fox, Civil Liability and Mandatory Disclosure, 109 Colum. L. Rev.
237, 252–60, 264–67 (2009) [hereinafter Fox, Civil Liability] (“More information, with the
resulting increase in price accuracy, improves the control market’s effectiveness in limiting
the agency costs of management.”).
4. Consistent with this view, the growing law and ﬁnance literature ﬁnds that
effective corporate and securities law is a precondition for the sophisticated capital
markets and corporate ownership structures that appear most closely associated with
economic growth. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 1152 (examining evidence and
concluding strong investor-protection laws correlate with economic growth). Securities law
also can improve pricing accuracy by facilitating the efficiency of capital market
microstructure through regulation. We need not address this function here.
5. See Jesse H. Choper, John C. Coffee, Jr. & Ronald J. Gilson, Cases and Materials
on Corporations 177–78 (8th ed. 2013) (discussing valuation of ﬁnancial assets).
6. See, e.g., Gary Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See
Them Coming 221 (2012) (reviewing past misunderstandings of ﬁnancial crises); Robert
E. Hall, The High Sensitivity of Economic Activity to Financial Frictions, 121 Econ. J. 351,
371 (2011) (arguing standard macroeconomic theory does not explain why drops in
output and employment persist for signiﬁcant periods after ﬁnancial crisis is resolved);
Robert E. Hall, Why Does the Economy Fall to Pieces After a Financial Crisis?, J. Econ.
Persp., Fall 2010, at 3, 3 (2010) (same); see also Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the
Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, 50 J. Econ. Literature 151, 154–55 (2012)
(presenting useful reviews of twenty-one books drawn from postcrisis deluge of works
analyzing crisis and appropriate responses).
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across all industries, in “idiosyncratic risk”7—that is, in the volatility of
individual ﬁrm’s share prices after adjustment for movements in the
market as a whole.8 This phenomenon, it turns out, is not limited to just
the most recent economic crisis. We show here for the ﬁrst time that a
dramatic spike in idiosyncratic risk has occurred with every major downturn since the 1920s.9 This association—between economic crisis and a
spike in idiosyncratic risk—is important to the law for two important reasons. First, the spike is caused by a crisis-induced sharp increase in the
importance of new information speciﬁcally concerning individual ﬁrms.
Information—its value and its disclosure—is at the center of much of
corporate and securities law. Second, idiosyncratic price changes are
important because they are at the core of event studies, an econometric
technique that, over the last few decades, has moved from an academic
tool to assess the impact on stock price of particular corporate actions to
providing the central means by which corporate and securities law is
applied to speciﬁc cases.10 For example, the Supreme Court recently
conﬁrmed the centrality of event studies in securities fraud class
actions,11 the predominant form of private securities litigation today.12
Now consider the 2008 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis’s impact on the stock
prices of individual ﬁrms. The volatility of individual stock prices increased sharply during the crisis.13 A portion of this increase is explained
by economy-wide factors like changes in general economic conditions
that affect share prices of all stocks. But much more than this was going
on. The larger part of the increase in each ﬁrm’s overall share price
volatility was due to a dramatic rise—ﬁve-fold as measured by variance—
in idiosyncratic risk, the portion of the volatility that cannot be explained
by changes in factors that affect all ﬁrms. Rather, there was a large
increase, relative to noncrisis times, in the extent to which an individual
ﬁrm’s share price deviated independently from the change in the market
as a whole.
This crisis-related spike in idiosyncratic risk presents a puzzle that is
important to understanding how law and ﬁnance interact. A ﬁrm’s share
price moves because there is news: a bit of information that changes
expectations about the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂow and hence the value of the
7. See infra section I.A (discussing spike in idiosyncratic risk during crisis).
8. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 2, at 174 (defining and comparing
“[ﬁrm-] speciﬁc risk” and “market risk”).
9. See infra section I.B (presenting empirical data on crises since 1920s).
10. See infra Part III (discussing use of event studies in securities litigation).
11. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2415 (2014) (discussing event studies in securities litigation).
12. See Merritt B. Fox, Securities Class Actions Against Foreign Issuers, 64 Stan. L.
Rev. 1173, 1176 (2012) [hereinafter Fox, Securities Class Actions] (noting fraud-on-themarket class actions “give rise to the bulk of all the damages paid out in settlements and
judgments pursuant to private litigation under the U.S. securities laws”).
13. See infra section I.A (presenting empirical data from 2008–2009 ﬁnancial crisis).
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ﬁrm’s shares.14 So for example, the announcement that a defense ﬁrm
received a proﬁtable government contract that was previously thought
possible, but not certain, is news: The chance that the contract would not
be received is eliminated. In an efficient market, as soon as a bit of news
is revealed, it is promptly and fully reﬂected in price.15 News is thus by
deﬁnition unpredictable—to be news it cannot be anticipated and thus
already incorporated in the ﬁrm’s stock price—with its importance
determined by how much the news changes expectations of a ﬁrm’s
future cash ﬂows. Future price changes are the result of subsequent news.
Some news affects expectations about the future cash ﬂows of most
or all ﬁrms because it concerns the overall state of economy—for
example, the future rate of economic growth, employment levels, interest
rates, or inﬂation. For any given ﬁrm’s stock, the portion of the total
variability in its share price due to such generally applicable news is
referred to as the stock’s “systematic” risk, or volatility. The remaining
variability in the ﬁrm’s share price is due to news that affects expectations
about its particular cash ﬂows and not about the cash ﬂows of most or all
other ﬁrms in the market—for example news of a labor strike,16 an R&D
breakthrough,17 or a regulatory development.18 The literature variously
refers to this as “idiosyncratic,” “unsystematic,” “ﬁrm-speciﬁc,” or “unique”
risk, or volatility.19 Thus, the ﬁve-fold increase in idiosyncratic volatility
during the 2008 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis tells us that each bit of news
14. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 2, at 365 (“[S]tock prices and company
values summarize investors’ collective assessment of how well a company is doing, both its
current performance and its future prospects.”).
15. See, e.g., id. at 324–25 (noting large body of accumulated empirical evidence that
publicly traded issuer shares listed on exchanges such as NYSE and NASDAQ show
immediate reactions to revelations of news, after which prices follow random walk).
16. See John Dinardo & Kevin F. Hallock, ‘When Unions Mattered’: The Impact of
Strikes on Financial Markets, 1925–1937, 55 Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 219, 226–32 (2002)
(employing event study methodology to ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative impacts of labor-strike
news on affected ﬁrms’ share prices).
17. See, e.g., Marta Falconi & Neil Maclucas, Novartis Boosted by Heart Drug Trials,
Wall St. J. (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405270230415720
4579473051376848032 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Novartis AG said Monday
it would seek approval for an experimental heart failure treatment sooner than it had
expected . . . . The news helped bolster shares of Novartis, which surged 3.31% in late
morning trading . . . .”).
18. See, e.g., Matthew Curtin, Volkswagen Shares Tumble Following Emissions
Allegations, Wall St. J. (Sept. 21, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/volkswagen-sharesdriven-lower-1442826436 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“The auto maker’s
nonvoting shares . . . were down 21% in morning trading amid fears of a huge ﬁne in the
U.S. as well as long-term damage to the reputation of Europe’s biggest auto maker by
sales.”). Stock prices are also affected by background noise in the securities markets—
movements that are uncorrelated with any new information. Thus, idiosyncratic risk will at
all times include this background noise. For purposes of this Article, we focus on
information-based idiosyncratic risk.
19. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 2, at 174 n.25 (“Speciﬁc risk may be called
unsystematic risk, residual risk, unique risk, or diversiﬁable risk.”).
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affecting only a particular ﬁrm altered, much more than in normal times,
expectations concerning that ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows. In essence, during
a crisis, all ﬁrms share an increased sensitivity to bits of news that, for
each, will not affect most other ﬁrms. As a consequence, for example, on
any good day for the market as a whole, there are far more big losers
than in normal times and on any bad day, far more big winners.
The puzzle is why. An economic crisis concerns problems in the
economy as a whole. Why would a crisis suddenly increase the importance of new information that is independent of the effect on the company of news about the overall economy? In this Article, we take up both
the causes of this large, crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk and
its implications for how the legal system uses ﬁnance, topics yet to be
addressed in either the ﬁnancial-economics or legal literature.
Part I begins by documenting more fully the link between economic
turmoil and idiosyncratic risk. Expanding on earlier work by Campbell et
al.,20 we conduct an empirical review, extending back to 1926 and
forward to the present. This review shows, for the ﬁrst time, that every
major economic downturn in this eighty-ﬁve-year period has been accompanied by a substantial spike in idiosyncratic volatility.
Part II seeks to explain why difficult economic times, which are
deﬁned in terms of market-wide phenomena, make the future of
individual ﬁrms more difficult to predict and so make individual stock
prices more volatile, independent of the crisis making the overall
economy’s future performance harder to predict. We canvass several
complementary answers. One is that, compared to ordinary times,
information about a ﬁrm contained in current news may become more
important in predicting its future cash ﬂows relative to the role of the
already existing stock of knowledge in making such predictions. A second
explanation is that the quality of management becomes more important
in crisis times. Consequently, the ordinary ﬂow of new information about
this subject can cause bigger movements in price because each bit tells
the market about something—the quality of management—that the
market now regards as more important than it did in ordinary times. A
third is that crisis creates uncertainty as to what factors, and hence what
information, are important to valuation. Because of this uncertainty, a
broader range of information has valuation implications and therefore
stock prices move more frequently.
Parts III and IV turn to the implications of our empirical results and
of their possible explanations for a number of legal issues that depend
analytically on valuation methodology: determining materiality and loss
20. John Y. Campbell, Martin Lettau, Burton G. Malkiel & Yexiao Xu, Have Individual
Stocks Become More Volatile? An Empirical Exploration of Idiosyncratic Risk, 56 J. Fin. 1,
3 (2001) [hereinafter Campbell et al., Empirical Exploration] (ﬁnding market-, industry-,
and ﬁrm-level volatility all “increase substantially in economic downturns and tend to lead
recessions”).
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causation in fraud-on-the-market securities litigation, determining materiality in cases involving claims of insider trading or of misstatements or
omissions in registered public offerings, and determining the extent of
deference that should be paid to a corporate board that rejects an
acquisition offer at a premium above the pre-offer market price.
Litigation with respect to each of these matters has, over the last few
decades, increasingly involved the empirical analysis—through the use of
event studies—of the idiosyncratic portion of share returns of the
companies involved.
The analysis in Part IV yields a number of important insights,
starting with ones relating to the use of event studies in fraud-on-themarket class actions, the actions that give rise to the bulk of damages and
settlements paid out as the result of private securities litigation. We show
that the conventional use of event studies during periods of economiccrisis-induced increased volatility results in understating the number of
occasions when a corporate misstatement can be shown to have had a
meaningful impact on a ﬁrm’s stock price. Lowering the standard for
statistical signiﬁcance in crisis times would help to correct for this
problem but causes an offsetting problem: With a lower standard, liability
is imposed more frequently where the misstatement in fact did not have
a sufficient impact on price to justify the costs associated with imposing
liability. In the end, this analysis shows that lowering the standard in
times of crisis is, on balance, no more likely to improve than to harm
social welfare. This suggests that during crisis times, Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) enforcement actions are especially important
because they offset the reduced effectiveness of private litigation.
We reach a similar conclusion with respect to insider trading and
public offerings of securities. This has particular signiﬁcance because the
information-based explanations that we ﬁnd most persuasive for why
economic crises lead to spikes in idiosyncratic risk suggest that, in crisis
times, insiders have substantially more opportunities to proﬁt from
trading on the nonpublic information that they possess and issuers have
more opportunities to sell securities at an inﬂated price.
Finally, “substantive coercion” is rarely a serious justiﬁcation for
target corporation deployment of takeover defenses, but crisis-induced
increases in idiosyncratic risk provide an unusually plausible claim that
target shareholders may make a mistake in tendering into a hostile offer.
However, the example of two cases that raise the issue close in time to
ﬁnancial crises—Quickturn21 and Airgas22—shows that even a substantive
coercion claim based on a crisis-induced spike in idiosyncratic risk is very
difficult to demonstrate.23
21. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
22. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
23. We refer occasionally to an online appendix that contains additional technical
information, further empirical results, and demonstrations of the robustness of our
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I. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD
In this Part, we demonstrate empirically both that there was a sharp
increase in idiosyncratic risk during the 2008 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis and
that this is not an isolated incident. An increase in idiosyncratic risk is
associated with poor macroeconomic performance throughout an eightyﬁve-year period going back to 1926. We show as well that the increase was
felt by ﬁrms across all industries. Moreover, while some of the increase in
idiosyncratic risk is due to the simple fact that the share prices of most
ﬁrms fell dramatically during the crisis, thereby increasing risk because of
the resulting higher ﬁrm debt–equity ratios, much of it is not.
A.

The 2008 to 2009 Financial Crisis

The 2008 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis illustrates starkly the spike in
idiosyncratic risk associated with economic crises. From July 1, 2008, to
June 30, 2009, ﬁrms in the S&P 100 experienced a ﬁve-fold increase in
the average idiosyncratic volatility, as measured by variance, compared to
2006 to 2007 and a three-fold increase compared to 2007 to 2008. While
2008 to 2009 was a period of enormous general economic turmoil24—
recall that Lehman Brothers failed25 and AIG was essentially nationalized
within seven days in September 200826—this increase in idiosyncratic
ﬁndings. See Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson, Economic Crises and the
Integration of Law and Finance: The Impact of Volatility Spikes app. (2015), https://
sites.google.com/site/volatilityspikesappendix/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter Appendix] (providing technical information and further results and
demonstrating robustness).
24. See Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, BEA 09-29, Gross
Domestic Product, 1st Quarter 2009 (Final), Corporate Profits, 1st Quarter 2009
(Revised) (2009), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2009/gdp109f.htm [http://
perma.cc/533U-PYGV] (“Real gross domestic product—the output of goods and services
produced by labor and property located in the United States—decreased at an annual rate
of 5.5 percent in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 . . . .”); Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce, BEA 09-11, Gross Domestic Product: Fourth Quarter 2008 (Final), Corporate
Proﬁts, Fourth Quarter 2008 (2009), http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/national/gdp/2009
/gdp408f.htm [http://perma.cc/9B73-7NWA] (“Real gross domestic product . . . decreased
at an annual rate of 6.3 percent in the fourth quarter of 2008 . . . .”); David M.
Herszenhorn, Bailout Plan Wins Approval; Democrats Vow Tighter Rules, N.Y. Times (Oct.
4, 2008), http://nytimes.com/2008/10/04/business/economy/04bailout.html?pagewanted=all
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting former Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
in 2008 urged “emergency bailout legislation with a warning that the American economy
was at risk of the worst economic collapse since the Depression”).
25. See Lehman Makes It Official in Overnight Chapter 11 Filing, Wall St. J.: Crisis on
Wall St. Blog (Sept. 15, 2008, 7:40 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/wallstreetcrisis/2008/09/15/
lehman-makes-it-official/ (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Lehman Brothers ﬁled
for Chapter 11 bankruptcy Monday in New York, as expected . . . .”).
26. See Edmund L. Andrews, Michael J. de la Merced & Mary Williams Walsh, Fed’s
$85 Billion Loan Rescues Insurer, N.Y. Times (Sept. 17, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com
/2008/09/17/business/17insure.html?pagewanted=all (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (“Fearing a ﬁnancial crisis worldwide, the Federal Reserve reversed course on
Tuesday and agreed to an $85 billion bailout that would give the government control of
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volatility reﬂects movement in individual ﬁrm prices that cannot be
explained by the direct impact of general economic conditions. While
the most extraordinary increases were among ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the
index—forty-fold during the crisis relative to 2006 to 2007—nonﬁnancial
ﬁrms increased volatility almost four-fold themselves.27 Just as dramatically, idiosyncratic risk then returned to approximately normal levels
by June 30, 2010. Thus, we see a spike-like pattern of crisis-induced
increase in idiosyncratic risk. Over a one-year period idiosyncratic risk
increases sharply and then, just as sharply, returns to precrisis levels.
These results are depicted graphically in Figure 1 and are reported in
Table 1 below.28

the troubled insurance giant American International Group.”). See generally Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Too Big to Fail (2009) (providing detailed narrative account of 2008 crisis at
Lehman Brothers and AIG).
27. These were ﬁrms in the S&P 100 as of March 9, 2009. Our analysis of all ﬁrms
traded on the NYSE, NASDAQ, and AMEX yielded similar results.
28. Figure 1 is calculated by ﬁrst estimating the company-speciﬁc volatility for each
ﬁrm that trades on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ on each day in 2004 to 2010. This
volatility is found using the variance of the error term in a CAPM regression over the last
year. So the volatility on January 1, 2005, represents what happened from January 1, 2004,
to December 31, 2004. Likewise January 2, 2005, represents what happened from January
2, 2004, to January 1, 2005. We then average the results for each day, weighting by market
capitalization of the ﬁrm. Table 1 uses the same method, but only for S&P 100 ﬁrms. In
each case, this company-speciﬁc volatility is measured by using the variance of the error
term in a market model regression of the ﬁrm’s daily returns (percentage changes in stock
price) over the last year. This regression estimates the ﬁrm’s β, which captures how, on
average over the year, the ﬁrm’s daily stock price responds to price changes in the market
as a whole. See generally Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 2, at 178–82 (“If you want to
know the contribution of an individual security to the risk of a well-diversiﬁed
portfolio . . . you need to measure its market risk, and that boils down to measuring how
sensitive it is to market movements. This sensitivity is called beta (β).”). On any given day,
this β can be used to estimate a predicted return for the ﬁrm based only on market
performance. The error term for the day is the difference between the ﬁrm’s actual return
and this predicted term. The variance of this error term over all the trading days of the
year is thus a measure of how much the ﬁrm’s share price is being moved around by news
that is independent of the news that moves the market as a whole around each day.
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Market- Cap-Weighted Annualized Idiosyncratic
Risk (Variance)

FIGURE 1: IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK 2004–2010
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TABLE 1: IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK OF S&P 100 FIRMS, 2005–2009
Market-Cap-Weighted Annual Idiosyncratic Risk
Period

B.

All

Financial29

Nonﬁnancial

July 1, 2005–June 30, 2006

3.5%

1.8%

3.8%

July 1, 2006–June 30, 2007

3.3%

1.7%

3.6%

July 1, 2007–June 30, 2008

5.7%

8.9%

5.4%

July 1, 2008–June 30, 2009

18.2%

74.0%

13.3%

Looking Back over Eight Decades

A relationship between downturns in GDP and idiosyncratic risk was
ﬁrst noted by Campbell et al. in 2001.30 They found that over the thirtyﬁve-year period from 1962 to 1997, a sharp increase in idiosyncratic risk
was associated with the 1970, 1974, 1980, 1982, and 1991 recessions as

29. The companies analyzed in Table 1 were part of the S&P 100 as of March 2, 2009.
By that point, the ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the index were the ones who had weathered the crisis
relatively well. Therefore, the exponential increase in volatility for ﬁnancial ﬁrms is not
attributable to companies like AIG, Bear Stearns, and Lehman.
30. Campbell et al., Empirical Exploration, supra note 20, at 3.
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well as with the October 1987 market break.31 Campbell et al. did not,
however, consider earlier crises, including the stock market crash of 1929
and the period of the Great Depression. Nor, of course, could they have
considered the dot-com boom and bust in the early 2000s or the Great
Recession of 2008 to 2009.
We have performed a study similar to Campbell et al. but extended
the period covered from 1926 to the present. As depicted in Figure 2
below, the results indicate that this pattern of increased idiosyncratic risk
associated with poor macroeconomic performance repeats itself throughout the much longer eighty-ﬁve-year period, with particularly high levels
of idiosyncratic risk at the time of the stock market crash of 1929, the
early years of the Great Depression in the early 1930s, the economy's
retreat into deep recession in 1937, and the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 to
2009.32 We also ﬁnd that idiosyncratic risk increases at times of market
boom as well, although the relationship is weaker—a point to which Part
III will return.

Market- Cap-Weighted Annualized Idiosyncratic
Risk (Variance)

FIGURE 2: IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK 1925–2010

100%

80%

60%

40%

20%

0%

31. See id. at 13 ﬁg.4 (showing “[a]nnualized ﬁrm-level volatility”).
32. The results depicted in Figure 2 are obtained in the same manner as those in
Figure 1. See supra note 28 (describing analysis). Our method is slightly different than
that used by Campbell et al., but our results for the period that our study and theirs
overlap are very similar. Appendix, supra note 23, at ﬁg.A-2.
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Sectoral Analysis

As shown in Table 1, the increase in ﬁnancial-sector volatility during
the 2008 to 2009 crisis dramatically outpaced that in the nonﬁnancial
sector. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether the average increase
among nonﬁnancial ﬁrms during the crisis was simply the shadow of the
crisis in ﬁnance falling on a few adjacent industries such as construction.
The answer is no. There was a substantial increase in average idiosyncratic volatility in each of the sixty-two-digit Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation (SIC) industries surveyed.33 Every industry saw its
idiosyncratic volatility, as measured by variance, increase more than 50%,
and in ﬁfty-eight of sixty sectors it more than doubled.34
Although ﬁrms in every industry experienced signiﬁcant increases in
idiosyncratic risk, what distinguishes those industries that experienced
the greatest increase? Interestingly, the sectors whose ﬁrms would
typically be seen as the riskiest prior to the crisis—those whose stock
prices were most sensitive to changes in general economic conditions
(i.e. those ﬁrms with the highest precrisis β (beta))35—were not the
sectors in which idiosyncratic risk increased the most. Rather, it was those
sectors with relatively low precrisis βs that saw the largest increases in
their idiosyncratic risk.
While a high absolute level of β prior to the crisis does not explain
the impact of an economic crisis on a company’s idiosyncratic risk, there
is a signiﬁcant relationship between crisis period increases in β and the
industries that showed the largest increases in idiosyncratic risk.36 That is,
those ﬁrms whose stock prices became more sensitive during the crisis to
changes in the overall economy, even though they had a low precrisis β,
also tended to have the greatest increase in idiosyncratic risk.37 This
33. Appendix, supra note 23, at tbl.A-2.
34. Codes 60–67 are ﬁnancial. The largest increases among nonﬁnancial ﬁrms were
in hotels, amusement services, lumber, and social services. As Figure A-3 in the online
appendix shows, controlling for industry-speciﬁc factors, along with those of the overall
market, does not alter the results. Appendix, supra note 23, at ﬁg.A-3.
35. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 2, at 178–82 (deﬁning “beta” as measure
of “how sensitive” particular asset “is to market movements”).
36. The results noted in this paragraph are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of
ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
37. One question about this ﬁnding should be addressed. We measure a ﬁrm’s
idiosyncratic volatility by running a market model, see John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo &
A. Craig MacKinlay, The Econometrics of Financial Markets 149–80 (1997) [hereinafter
Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, Econometrics], to net out the impact of the broader market
on the individual stock. In so doing, we estimate the ﬁrm’s β, which captures how the
ﬁrm’s stock responds to changes in the market. Supra note 28. Using this β allows one to
estimate a predicted return for the ﬁrm based only on market performance. The
idiosyncratic risk is derived from how much the actual return varies from the predicted
return. If the estimated β departs from the “true” β, the predicted return will be less
accurate. This will increase measured idiosyncratic risk regardless of whether the
estimated β is too large (in which case when the market goes up, the predicted return will
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ﬁnding supports the ﬁrst of our possible explanations for the reported
crisis-related increase in unsystematic risk: When a ﬁrm is subject to a
structural change in the economy, as reﬂected by an increase in the
ﬁrm’s β, each new bit of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information will take on greater
signiﬁcance and hence move price more.
D. The Effects of Leverage
An alternative explanation for all or part of our reported increase in
ﬁrm-speciﬁc volatility during economic crises is that the increase is
caused by an increase in ﬁrms’ leverage. Because the value of most ﬁrms’
equity decreases during crises, their debt–equity ratio increases correspondingly. The 2008 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis illustrates the phenomenon:
From peak to trough, the market capitalization of all ﬁrms in the Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database declined 55%. It is well
understood that an increase in a ﬁrm’s debt–equity ratio increases the
variability of both the systematic and, of particular interest to us, the
idiosyncratic portions of a ﬁrm’s returns.38 This is because debt is paid
be too positive and if the market goes down, too negative) or whether β is too small (in
which case when the market goes up, the predicted return will not be positive enough and
when the market goes down, it will not be negative enough).
As detailed in section I.D and in the online appendix, for the typical ﬁrm this
estimate of β, though unbiased, is less accurate during crisis times than in normal times
because the actual value of β over the period of the year is likely to change more in crisis
times due to changes in the ﬁrm’s leverage triggered by sharp changes in the value of its
equity. Appendix, supra note 23, at 8–11. Thus, one might speculate that the reported
result—that ﬁrms in sectors whose βs, as we estimated them, increased the most also had
the largest increases in idiosyncratic risk—might be an artifact of this less accurate
assessment of their βs rather than evidence of a positive relationship between an increase
in a ﬁrm’s true β during crisis and ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. The underlying intuition would be
that most of the ﬁrms whose βs appeared to have experienced the greatest increases might
in fact be those whose estimated βs, by chance, deviated the most on the upside from their
actual βs. If this is correct, then our assessments of their idiosyncratic risk would also be
more inﬂated than ﬁrms where the estimated β was closer to the true value.
This concern, however, appears to be unwarranted. If it were correct, we should, for
the same reasons of chance, also see an increase in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk in sectors whose
estimated βs dropped dramatically during the crisis because they would have a
concentration of ﬁrms whose estimated βs deviated the most on the downside from their
true values. In fact, sectors whose estimated βs dropped during the crisis were no more
likely to see a relatively large increase in ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk than those whose estimated βs
were unchanged.
As a further sensitivity check, we also measured ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk using very short
periods (twenty trading days) to minimize the possible impact of the decline in the
accuracy of our β estimates compared to those based on a full year, during which the value
of the true β may have shifted much more substantially than in a month. The results,
reported in the appendix, are very similar to those presented in the text, again suggesting
that the decline in the accuracy of our β estimates does not explain the results presented
in the text. Id. at 12.
38. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 2, at 434–35 (“The expected rate of return
on the common stock of a levered ﬁrm increases in proportion to the debt-equity
ratio . . . .”); Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation
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ﬁrst from the ﬁrm’s underlying cash ﬂows, with equity receiving whatever
residuals there are. Absent insolvency, the residual going to equity thus
bears all the variability in the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂow. When the total value of the
equity in a ﬁrm is reduced, this variability will be concentrated on fewer
dollars of equity and so the return on each such dollar varies more.
Perhaps, then, the crisis-related spikes in idiosyncratic risk simply
reﬂect the effect of the crisis-related decreases in equity value.39 Then
there is no puzzle to explain, and the focus can turn directly to the legal
implications of these ﬁndings. To address this possibility, we added
explicit controls for the effect on idiosyncratic risk of the increase in
leverage.40 As depicted in Figure 3, however, no more than one-quarter
of the observed increase in idiosyncratic volatility in the most recent
crisis was due to the leverage effect that arises from depressed share
prices.41
Thus, the puzzle with which this Part began still remains: Why,
during periods of economic crisis, are large increases in idiosyncratic risk
consistently associated with a company’s stock? We address this puzzle in
the next Part.

Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am. Econ. Rev. 261, 267–72 (1958) (“[T]he
expected yield of a share of stock is equal to the appropriate capitalization rate ρk for a
pure equity stream in the class, plus a premium related to ﬁnancial risk equal to the debtto-equity ratio times the spread between ρk and r.” (emphasis omitted)).
39. We are grateful to Mark Weinstein for raising this point.
40. For each ﬁrm, we adjust for the effect of leverage by deﬂating the unadjusted
daily volatility by multiplying it by the ﬁrm’s Equity/(Debt+Equity) on that day. For more
details, see Appendix, supra note 23, at 10 (explaining mathematical computation of
unlevered β based on ﬁrm’s ratio of debt to equity).
41. The online appendix also discusses and seeks to control for a second leveragerelated impact on our measure of idiosyncratic risk, a changing (“unstable”) β during the
observation period. Id. at 11. This too will increase the level of idiosyncratic risk measured
for the typical ﬁrm. We ﬁnd, however, that the second effect is in fact even less important
than the ﬁrst and so explains relatively little of the crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic
risk that we have observed.
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Market- Cap-Weighted Annualized Idiosyncratic Risk
(Std. Dev.)

FIGURE 3: IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK OF S&P 100 FIRMS
ADJUSTED FOR LEVERAGE
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II. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
As noted above, Campbell et al. ﬁrst reported that idiosyncratic risk
increases during crisis periods.42 Their focus, however, was not on
explaining this link, but on explaining what they saw as a secular increase
in idiosyncratic volatility from 1962 through 1997. We focus here on the
puzzle presented by extending their observation period to the eighty-ﬁve
years from 1926 through 2010. From the lead up to the Great Depression
through what has come to be called the Great Recession, economic
downturns repeatedly coincide with spikes in idiosyncratic volatility. Why
should a crisis be associated with an increase in risk unrelated to the
general economic disorder? We consider three possible explanations.
One, explored in section II.A is that, compared to ordinary times,
information about a ﬁrm contained in current news may become more
important in predicting its future cash ﬂows relative to the role of the
already existing stock of knowledge in making such predictions. A
second explanation, explored in section II.B, is that the quality of
management becomes more important in crisis times. Consequently, the
ordinary ﬂow of new information about this subject can cause bigger
movements in price because each bit tells the market about something—
the quality of management—that the market now regards as more
42. Campbell et al., Empirical Exploration, supra note 20, at 3.
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important than it did in ordinary times. A third explanation, explored in
section II.C, is that crisis creates uncertainty as to what factors, and hence
what information, are important to valuation. Because of this uncertainty,
a broader range of information has valuation implications and therefore
stock prices move more frequently. These three explanations share a
common theme: Economic crises increase both the frequency and the
impact of news with valuation consequences for an individual company’s
stock. New information becomes more valuable and more information is
likely to be new, with the consequence of increased idiosyncratic volatility.
A.

Current News Becomes Relatively More Important

In a rational market, share price at any given moment reﬂects the
aggregate of investors’ predictions of an issuer’s future net cash ﬂows.43
These predictions are based on a large collection of bits of information,
much of it accumulated over a period of years, but some of which at any
time is new. In an informationally efficient market, the new information
in each bit is by deﬁnition unpredictable before it is received. This new
information is what causes the issuer’s share price to ﬂuctuate in a
random walk: If new information cannot be predicted, then neither can
the direction of its impact on price. How much a stock’s price moves one
way or the other depends on the predictive importance of the new bit of
information relative to the predictive value of the previously accumulated
information concerning that stock.
A ﬁrst explanation for the association between economic crises and
spikes in idiosyncratic volatility is that during an economic crisis, each bit
of new information is likely to be more important relative to the existing
stock of information for predicting the future. This should be true not
only for information relevant to predicting the economy’s overall
performance but also for information that is relevant to predicting the
future cash ﬂows of only a single ﬁrm.
One reason that the predictive importance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc new
information increases in an economic downturn is that investors expect
structural changes in the economy to accompany a downturn. This is at
least in part true because major downturns are usually the result of
imbalances in the economy: in the case of the recent ﬁnancial crisis, an
unsustainable level of resources going into construction of residential
and commercial buildings and into the ﬁnancial industry. But the exact
nature of this structural change and its implications, good or bad, for any
particular ﬁrm might not yet be fully understood, as the deluge of books
seeking to explain the Great Recession strikingly demonstrates.44 In

43. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 2, at 80 (noting present value of share of
stock equals expected future dividends per share, discounted to present value).
44. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Getting up to Speed on the Financial Crisis:
A One-Weekend-Reader’s Guide, 50 J. Econ. Literature 128, 128–29 (2012) (proposing
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essence, an economic crisis “shakes the box.” Everyone knows that when
things settle down, the relations among ﬁrms, and those between each
ﬁrm and its suppliers and customers, are likely to be different than
before the crisis. Relative to each other, some ﬁrms will gain and others
will lose from these changed relations. But no one is yet sure exactly what
pattern these new relations will take and hence what companies will be
the winners or losers. A new bit of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information can have a
bigger price impact than in normal times because the bit may disclose
something about this new pattern of relations.
Consider, for example, a not-fully-anticipated quarterly earnings announcement that is 10% lower than would have been predicted by the
earnings path over the previous few years. This shortfall could be due to
random ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors not likely to repeat themselves, or it could
be due to a more enduring change in the fundamental factors shaping
the environment in which the ﬁrm operates—the costs of its inputs, the
market for its outputs, or the technology that the ﬁrm uses to transform
one into the other—that will continue to inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows
for many periods to come. A not-fully-anticipated quarterly earnings
shortfall typically would have some impact on investor predictions about
a ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows and hence on its share price. In making these
predictions in normal times, however, investors might assign much more
weight to the ﬁrm’s longer-term history of earnings because they are
indicative of the environment within which the ﬁrm had been operating
and there would be little reason to believe that the environment had
changed radically during this most recent quarter.
During an economic crisis, in contrast, changes in the structure of
the economy that signiﬁcantly impact the ﬁrm are much more likely.
However, there will at ﬁrst be no clear understanding of the nature of
these changes. The new piece of information concerning the quarterly
earnings shortfall thus takes on more importance because there is a
greater likelihood that the change in earnings is due to changes in more
enduring factors affecting the long-run success of the ﬁrm, rather than to
ﬂuke factors unlikely to repeat themselves. Put differently, in such times,
new information takes on greater importance because the economic
crisis degrades the value of the old stock of information in helping to
predict the future.45
This explanation is consistent with a second feature of our results. As
shown in Figure 1, the crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk is truly
“reading list” of sixteen key documents for understanding crisis); Lo, supra note 6, at 154
(reviewing twenty-one books about crisis).
45. It should be noted that, even in normal times, a relatively small earnings shortfall
from what was expected can have a signiﬁcant effect on price. The earnings miss may
indicate that despite all efforts to massage the numbers, the company still could not make
the estimate, which suggests that something more important than a small miss has
occurred. In crisis times, though, the shortfall would still, for the reasons discussed in the
text, be expected to lead to an even bigger price decline.
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spike-like: The increased volatility disappears as quickly as it appears.
This suggests that once the market ﬁgures out the new shape of the
postcrisis structural relationships, idiosyncratic risk returns to historical
levels. In this explanation, new information is important to understanding the crisis-induced change in the structure of relationships
among ﬁrms, and the volatility spike is the artifact of that importance.
Once it is understood, the cause of increased idiosyncratic volatility
disappears because new information no longer carries the extra, crisisrelated capacity to cause large changes in predictions.
The structural change explanation for the increase in idiosyncratic
volatility during crisis periods is also supported by the ﬁnding that ﬁrms
in sectors that experienced the largest increase in their βs during the
recent ﬁnancial crisis—that is, ones that relative to other ﬁrms became
more sensitive to factors that affect the market as a whole—also displayed
the greatest increases in idiosyncratic risk.46 It is reasonable to think that
ﬁrms that were most affected by crisis-induced changes in the structure
of the economy would tend to experience the biggest changes in their βs.
These are the ﬁrms for whom, during a crisis, new bits of information
would have the most predictive power relative to the prior stock of
knowledge. In accordance with our ﬁrst explanation, these are the ﬁrms
that would display the greatest increases in idiosyncratic volatility.
A period where the market is rising rapidly, for example during the
Internet boom, also may signal disruption and structural change, where
again new information takes on more importance. Our ﬁndings are
consistent with this circumstance as well—idiosyncratic risk goes up in
sharp market upturns.47 The increase is not as great as in market
downturns, but the smaller impact is likely at least in part due to the
deleveraging effect of rising stock prices, the opposite of the leverage
effect we analyzed in section I.D.
The following hypothetical demonstrates the ﬁrst explanation.
Imagine that you have a barrel with 200 colored balls in it, divided in a
ratio between red and green that you are trying to estimate. Each period,
you randomly draw one ball, note its color, and put the ball back in the
barrel. After, say, twenty periods, you will have a pretty good sense of the
ratio in the barrel, and you will not change your estimate very much
based on whether the twenty-ﬁrst ball drawn is red or green. Now
suppose that of the 200, 100 randomly selected balls are taken out of the
barrel and 100 new balls are substituted for them. The newly substituted
balls have an unknown ratio of red to green that might be quite different
than the ratio of the 200 original balls. When you take out the twentysecond ball, the outcome (that is, the new bit of information)—whether
it is red or green—will change your estimate of the ratio in the barrel
much more than it would have absent the substitution.
46. See supra section I.C (presenting sectoral-analysis ﬁndings).
47. Supra Figure 2.
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Information Concerning Quality of Management Becomes More Important

The phenomenon of crisis-enhanced new information has a special
role when the information concerns the quality of management. When
troubled times sharply change the overall business environment, the
importance of an established ﬁrm’s management becomes more like the
importance of a startup’s management in normal times. Management
confronts more, and more important, decisions than in normal times.
It is well recognized that startup management has special importance because the company’s value is primarily comprised of future
growth options, as opposed to being based on the cash ﬂows from an
existing business.48 At this early stage, management needs to make more
choices of the kind that shape the fundamental direction of the ﬁrm.
Moreover, the consequences of these choices are less obvious than they
are with an established ﬁrm in normal times because there is no history
of the consequences of making similar decisions in the past. Having highquality managers—persons who are better at predicting the consequences of their more difficult choices despite the lack of such history—
will thus have a larger impact on expected performance. Crisis thus can
put the managers of even mature ﬁrms in a situation closer to that of a
startup. The sharp change in the mature ﬁrm’s business environment
may force managers to make more fundamental choices, and history will
be a less reliable guide as to their consequences. As a result, the quality
of management has a larger impact on the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂows.
In addition to the extent to which each bit of crisis-related
information newly reveals something about the quality of a mature ﬁrm’s
management, the subject that bit of new information concerns—
management quality—also has greater implications for the ﬁrm’s future
cash ﬂows. Therefore, the signiﬁcance of the bit in predicting these
future cash ﬂows becomes more important. As a consequence, the
revelation of new information concerning management quality causes a
bigger share price change and therefore, greater volatility than in
noncrisis times.
C.

Model Failure: Ignorance Concerning What Facts Are Initially Relevant

Investors’ expectations about a company’s future cash ﬂows are
typically based on an implicit model that tells them something about the
meaning and importance of new information about the company. In
essence, investors have a model that tells them what information is
important for predicting future cash ﬂows. In an economic crisis,
systemic changes may make investors less conﬁdent that they still know
48. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from
the American Experience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1067, 1076–77 (2003) (noting at start-up stage,
“quality of the company’s management . . . takes on heightened importance because so
large a portion of the portfolio company’s value depends on management’s future decisions”).
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which facts have valuation implications. Because of that uncertainty, a
much wider range of facts potentially matter and so the appearance of
more kinds of information will move prices. Moreover, any particular
new bit of information can have greater importance. Not only does it
directly tell investors something more about the ﬁrm’s future cash ﬂow, it
may also provide information about the shape of a new valuation model
that suggests a different range of information that will be relevant to
predicting the ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows in the future. This may put an already
existing stock of knowledge in new perspective, in effect, turning old
information into new. Thus, new information and more kinds of
information can potentially move price a great deal.
This third explanation differs from the ﬁrst explanation—that current news becomes more relevant—in that the situation in the ﬁrst
explanation could be fully described in terms of risk, while the third
explanation resembles more Knightian uncertainty.49 Continuing with
the analogy of sampling from a barrel of balls, you still need to estimate
the ratio of the colors of the balls in the barrel, but you can no longer
even be sure that there are only red balls and green balls after the substitution of the 100 new balls. Suppose, after this substitution, the twentysecond ball drawn is yellow, not red or green. The draw tells you not only
something about the ratio of balls, it tells you that your old model—a
two-color distribution—is no longer accurate. Thus, you get a whole new
kind of information relevant to predicting the contents of the barrel.50

49. See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Proﬁt 233–34 (1921) (distinguishing
between risk, which can be predicted probabilistically, and uncertainty, which cannot).
50. Warren Buffett has famously made a related point. In his terms, “[Y]ou only ﬁnd
out who is swimming naked when the tide goes out.” Letter from Warren E. Buffett,
Chairman, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. 10 (Feb. 28,
2002), http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2001pdf.pdf [http://perma.cc/QUJ7-X8PG].
Put more precisely, but less amusingly, good times allow a pooling equilibrium
concerning ﬁrm quality, and the economic crisis results in separation. While Buffet’s point
covers part of our analysis, it does not address an important aspect of our data. Our
measure documenting the idiosyncratic volatility increase involves the variance of daily
market-adjusted price changes over a twelve-month period. For most ﬁrms in the sample,
much of the increased variance in the idiosyncratic portion of the ﬁrm’s returns comes
from an increase in both the upside and the downside. In contrast, Buffet’s separating
effect of bad economic times—revealing which are the bad ﬁrms and which are the good
ones—would, for any given ﬁrm, work in just one direction. Moreover, if the large declines
in share price associated with the revelation of dishonest or incompetent management
drove a signiﬁcant portion of the crisis-times increase in idiosyncratic risk, then, compared
to normal times, the largest drops should explain a substantially higher portion (relative
to what we have observed) of the total amount of such risk during the twelve-month
period. As discussed in the online appendix, in crisis and in precrisis times alike, about the
same portion of total idiosyncratic risk is explained by the biggest drops, a result
inconsistent with the “tide goes out” explanation. See Appendix, supra note 23, at 8 ﬁg.A5 (comparing unadjusted market-cap-weighted volatility with estimates after truncating tails).
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III. THE EFFECTS OF CRISIS-INDUCED SPIKES IN IDIOSYNCRATIC
VOLATILITY ON EVENT STUDIES
Over the last few decades, ﬁnancial economics and related econometric tools have become increasingly integrated into corporate and
securities law analysis and practice. The synergy is straightforward:
Financial economics speaks to how assets are valued and corporate and
securities laws provide a structure in which value can be created. This
sensible trend has proceeded, however, without an appreciation of the
dramatic several-fold increase in idiosyncratic volatility accompanying
economic bad times that we have documented here and sought to
explain. Yet the sharp price drops that accompany bad times make these
times precisely when there are more plaintiffs’ suits, more governmental
enforcement actions, and more calls for regulatory change. This Part and
Part IV take a fresh look at the link between ﬁnancial economics and
corporate and securities law in light of what we have shown is the
predictable spike in idiosyncratic volatility that accompanies each major
economic downturn. Sections IV.A and IV.B consider the impact of crisisrelated spikes in idiosyncratic volatility on the use of event studies in
connection with a number of issues that arise in securities litigation.
Section IV.C then turns to the impact of these spikes on the extent to
which incumbent management’s valuation of a target company should
receive deference in the context of a contest for corporate control.
Financial economics focuses centrally on what factors inﬂuence the
price of a security. The inquiry can be framed by identifying an event that
may inﬂuence a security’s price and then seeking to measure the impact
of that event on the price of the security in question. Measuring the price
impact of a particular event, however, requires isolating the effect of a
single item of information—the occurrence of the event under study—
from the cacophony of information constantly reaching the capital
markets. This is the province of an event study.51 Over the last few
decades courts have come, as a practical (and probably as a legal) matter,
to require plaintiffs to conduct an event study for many securities fraud
class actions to proceed.52 As we will see, the level of idiosyncratic
51. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law Part I:
Technique and Corporate Litigation, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 141, 142 (2002) (explaining
methodology of event studies focuses on movement of stock prices due to speciﬁc events);
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law Part II: Empirical Studies of
Corporate Law, 4 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 380, 380 (2002) (“[E]vent studies provide a metric
for measurement of the impact upon stock prices of policy decisions.”).
52. See, e.g., Bricklayers & Trowel Trades Int’l Pension Fund v. Credit Suisse First
Bos., 853 F. Supp. 2d 181, 186 (D. Mass. 2012) (“An event study . . . often plays a ‘pivotal’
role in proving loss causation and damages in a securities fraud case. Given the difficulty
inherent in proving the effect, if any, of a single news item on the price of a stock, many
courts require them in such cases.” (citation omitted)); In re Williams Sec. Litig., 496 F.
Supp. 2d 1195, 1272–73 (N.D. Okla. 2007) (“‘ [A] number of courts have rejected or
refused to admit . . . damages reports or testimony by damages experts in securities cases
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volatility associated with a company’s stock is central to the event study
methodology and the sharp spikes in such volatility that accompany
economic crises cause problems. To see why, we need to start with a brief
account of how an event study is conducted.
A.

Event Study Basics

It would be very useful to be able to identify the impact of a
particular event on a stock’s price. For example, on the day that any
particular item of news relating to a speciﬁc issuer becomes public, say
the announcement of an acquisition, other bits of news concerning the
company also may affect its share price. So the mere fact that the share
price moved up or down that day does not show that the price movement
was caused by the acquisition. In assessing whether the acquisition will
increase a ﬁrm’s value, it would be helpful to observe just the effect of
the acquisition announcement—to separate the effect of the “event”
from that of any other bits of news relevant to the company’s future cash
ﬂows and of random noise. An event study helps distinguish between the
different possible inﬂuences on stock price in order to assess the extent
to which a particular item of information affected price.53
1. Determining the Market-Adjusted Price Change. — Conducting an
event study begins with measuring the market-adjusted change in the
issuer’ s share price when the item of interest becomes public. The
market-adjusted change is the difference between the observed price
change and what the change in overall stock market prices predicts
would have been the issuer’s price change. This prediction is based on
the historical relationship (usually over a one-year observation period
ending shortly before disclosure of the item of interest) between price
changes in the overall market and price changes of the issuer’s stock.
Making this market adjustment removes the inﬂuence on the stock’s
price of news that affects the price of all ﬁrms’ stock, i.e., bits of
systematic news. What is left—the market-adjusted price change—is the
which fail to include event studies or something similar.’” (quoting In re Imperial Credit
Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (C.D. Cal. 2003))).
53. Those familiar with event studies will recognize a fundamental difference
between event studies as originally developed in ﬁnancial economics and event studies as
they are used in securities litigation. In ﬁnancial economics, the key to an event study is
that the task is to measure the effect of an event in general—does it affect stock price over
a sample of companies that experienced the event?—not the effect of an event on a
particular company’s stock price. The ﬁnancial economics approach uses a sample of all
companies that experienced the event in question to regress out the effect of all the other
events affecting a company’s stock price. If the number of companies in the sample is
large enough, the other events affecting particular companies cancel each other out. See
Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, Econometrics, supra note 37, at 149–80 (explaining event
study methodology).
A single-company event study, as used in the securities litigation context, must address
the problem of other events occurring close in time to the event under study in other
ways. The text is concerned with single-ﬁrm event studies.
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portion of the observed change in price that is due to ﬁrm-speciﬁc news
or background noise. Because in securities litigation, the news item of
interest relates speciﬁcally to the issuer, eliminating the impact of
systematic news is critical.54
To give an example, suppose that the share price of the issuer under
study was $100.00 at the end of the trading day immediately preceding
the item of interest’s disclosure and is $96.50 by the end of the day on
which the item of interest is disclosed. Suppose as well that the market as
a whole went down 1% on the day of the item of interest and that the
issuer’s β is 1.5.55 Based on this historical relationship between day-to-day
changes in the issuer’s share price and the corresponding market-wide
price changes, we would predict that if ﬁrm-speciﬁc news, including the
item of interest, had on a net basis no effect on the issuer’s share price,
the issuer’s price would have dropped to $98.50. But in fact it dropped to
$96.50. So the remainder of the observed price change—referred to as
the market-adjusted price change—would be −$2.00, or −2.00%. As
depicted in Figure 4, this is the portion of the total observed price
change that can be attributed to ﬁrm-speciﬁc news.56

54. Courts recognize the need to separate systematic from unsystematic movements
in stock price based on the utility of single-ﬁrm event studies in accomplishing this. For
examples of courts requiring the use of event studies to strip away any movement in price
caused by market-wide trends for plaintiffs to establish loss causation, see Imperial Credit
Indus., Inc., 252 F. Supp. 2d at 1015–16 (rejecting testimony of plaintiff’s expert for failure
to include “event study or similar analysis . . . [to] eliminate that portion of the price
decline . . . which is unrelated to the alleged wrong,” but attributable to “market events for
which Defendants cannot be held responsible” (citations omitted)); In re N. Telecom Ltd.
Sec. Litig., 116 F. Supp. 2d 446, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[Plaintiff’s expert’s] testimony is
fatally deﬁcient in that he did not perform an event study or similar analysis to remove the
effects on stock price of market and industry information . . . .”).
55. See supra note 28 (explaining concept of β).
56. See Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, Econometrics, supra note 37, at 149–80
(discussing methodology of event studies).
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FIGURE 4: ISOLATION OF FIRM-SPECIFIC NEWS THROUGH
MARKET-ADJUSTMENT
Market-adjusted price change=
−$2.00 (price impact of all
background noise and firm-specific
news, including the impact, if any,
of the item of interest)

Closing price day of
announcement of
the item of interest

Market adjustment
=1.5 x (−.01) x $100.000
= −$1.50

Market-adjusted
price

Closing price
day before
announcement
of the item of
interest

2. Judging the Market-Adjusted Price Change Against Its Historical
Volatility. — The next step in an event study determines the likelihood
that at least part of the observed market-adjusted price change results
from the item of interest. In essence we are asking the following
question: How likely is it that we would observe a market-adjusted price
change of the magnitude that was observed on the day the item of
interest was announced if in fact the change results solely from the day’s
other bits of ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and background noise? This can be
answered by comparing the issuer’s market-adjusted price change on the
relevant date with the historical record of the daily, market-adjusted ups
and downs in the issuer’s share price, typically over the approximately
250 trading days in a one-year observation period ending on a day shortly
before the item of interest’s disclosure, i.e., by comparing the magnitude
of the market-adjusted price change on the day of the announcement
with the issuer’s historical idiosyncratic volatility.
As a general matter, market-adjusted price changes, up and down,
are distributed in a pattern closely resembling what would be produced
by a normal (bell-shaped curve) probability distribution with a zero
mean.57 The conventional event study assumes that the same probability
57. While the event studies used by experts in securities litigation cases almost
universally assume that these price changes are normally distributed, it has been
recognized for some time that the actual distribution of these changes is not perfectly
normal. See, e.g., Stephen J. Brown & Jerold B. Warner, Using Daily Stock Returns: The
Case of Event Studies, 14 J. Fin. Econ. 3, 4–5 (1985) (discussing non-normal distribution
in daily stock returns). This has led some commentators to call for using another
technique for conducting event studies in securities litigation situations. See, e.g., Jonah B.
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distribution generates the market-adjusted price change on each of the
approximately 250 trading days during the observation period and the
net price impact of all ordinary, day-to-day ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and
background noise other than any impact from the item of interest on the
day that it is announced. Because of the size of the sample, the standard
deviation of the observation period’s approximately 250 market-adjusted
price changes is a fairly precise estimate of the standard deviation of this
probability distribution.
Because this probability function is a normal distribution, the net
price impact of all the other ﬁrm-speciﬁc news of the day and
background noise will be within plus or minus 1.96 standard deviations
of the mean, 95% of the time. From this, we can see that if the item of
interest in fact had no impact on price, there is less than a 5% chance
that we would observe a market-adjusted price change on the day it was
announced that is plus or minus, more than 1.96 standard deviations
from the mean. Therefore, if we observe a market-adjusted price change
this large, we can reject with at least 95% conﬁdence the null hypothesis
that the item of interest had no impact on price. Accordingly, observed
market-adjusted price changes that are large enough to pass this test are
often referred to as being statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level.58
These points may be most easily understood by extending our
example above. Suppose, for purpose of illustration, that the standard
deviation of the market-adjusted price changes during the observation
period was 1%. This would mean that on the day the item of interest is
announced, the net price impact of the other ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and
background noise would 95% of the time be somewhere between +1.96%
and −1.96%, as illustrated in Figure 5. It would be outside this range on
the positive side 2.5% of the time and on the negative side 2.5% of the
time. In our example, the observed market-adjusted price change on the
day of the announcement of the item of interest was −$2.00 or −2.00%.
This is more than 1.96 times the standard deviation of the day-to-day ups
and downs in the market-adjusted price during the observation period,
and so the price change was statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level.

Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm, Single-Event
Studies, 15 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 495, 496–99 (2013) (explaining ﬂaws of standard
approach and proposing alternative test). The overall analysis in this Article would apply
equally to these other techniques.
58. See generally Campbell, Lo & MacKinlay, Econometrics, supra note 37, at 149–80
(explaining history and methodology of event study analysis). As a technical matter, saying
that we can reject the null hypothesis with “95% conﬁdence” is the province of Bayesian
statistics. Our terminology, however, is commonly used with event studies and shall be
thought of as shorthand for saying there is a less than 5% chance of observing a result this
extreme if the null hypothesis is true.
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FIGURE 5: DEMONSTRATION THAN AN ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN ITEM OF
INTEREST WITH NO NEGATIVE IMPACT ON PRICE WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED
BY A MARKET-ADJUSTED PRICE CHANGE AS NEGATIVE AS −$2.00
LESS THAN 2.5% OF THE TIME

The mean of the distribution of the impact of firm-specific news and background noise other
than the item of interest will be zero. So if the item of interest has no impact on price, the
mean of the distribution of possible observed market-adjusted prices equals $98.50. The net
impact of background noise and firm-specific news other than the item of interest will be
negative by more than $1.96 (1.96 standard deviations) no more than 2.5% of the time.
This means that when the impact of the item of interest is zero, there is a 2.5% chance that
the observed price will be equal to or below $96.54, i.e., the Type I error rate is 2.5%.

If the difference between the issuer’s market-adjusted price change
when the event of interest is disclosed and its historic market-adjusted
price change over the observation period is large enough to pass this test
of statistical signiﬁcance and no other important bits of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information become public close in time to the event of interest, we can,
with at least 95% conﬁdence, reject the null hypothesis that the observed
market-adjusted price change was due entirely to factors other than
disclosure of the item of interest. In other words, the observer can reject
with this level of conﬁdence the proposition that the item of interest had
no effect on price.59
59. The foregoing discussion presents a somewhat simpliﬁed version of the event
studies that are typically conducted by experts giving testimony in securities actions. For
example, there is usually a control for industry-speciﬁc pieces of information as well as for
systematic information, which will entail some complications concerning the proper
deﬁnition of the industry. Also, sometimes the event window in which the market-adjusted
price change is measured is longer than one day. In addition, often the baseline one-year
observation period used to determine the standard deviation has removed days on which
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Type I and Type II Errors in the Use of Event Studies for Securities
Litigation

A securities fraud class action typically is based on the theory that a
corporate disclosure caused the issuer’s stock price to move in a particular direction. An event study is used to test that theory. For example, if
the purchaser of a security claimed that a corporate misstatement
inﬂated the price she paid and that she suffered a loss when the stock
price dropped in response to the truth coming out, she would seek to
prove that the corrective disclosure negatively affected the price.60
As just discussed, because there are potentially many other bits of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and general background noise affecting an issuer’s
share price on the same day that the item of interest is announced, we
cannot determine with certainty whether the item of interest had any
negative impact on price. We instead use an event study to make a
probabilistic assessment of whether the item in fact had an effect on the
company’s share price. An event study addresses this question by providing a probabilistic assessment of whether the corrective disclosure had
a negative effect on the company’s share price. As the question is usually
put, did the issuer’s stock price decline by a statistically signiﬁcant
amount? For our purposes here, the critical fact is that this test will
generate a certain rate of false positives (Type I errors) and of false
negatives (Type II errors). Type I errors occur when the item of interest
did not in fact have an impact on price but the observed market-adjusted
price change on the day it was announced was sufficiently negative to
nonetheless pass this test. Type II errors occur when the item of interest
did in fact have an impact on price but the observed market-adjusted
price change on the day it was announced was not statistically signiﬁcant.
Again, these two types of errors are most easily understood by going
back to our example. When the standard deviation is properly speciﬁed, as
will be the case in normal economic times,61 the Type I error rate depends
solely on the level of statistical conﬁdence required by the test (for

there are identiﬁable, obviously important bits of ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and in parallel, there
is an attempt to remove the impact of any other identiﬁable, obviously important bits of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc news on the day that the item of interest is disclosed. For a discussion of these
elaborations on the simple model presented here, see, e.g., Allen Ferrell & Atanu Saha,
The Loss Causation Requirement for Rule 10b-5 Causes of Action: The Implications of
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 63 Bus. Law. 163, 166–67 (2007). None of these
elaborations of event-study methodology affect the points that we seek to make.
60. For purposes of illustration, we will assume throughout this Article that the
legally relevant question is whether an item of news had a negative effect on price, but a
symmetrical version of the discussion would be equally valid where the legally relevant
question is whether the item had a positive effect on price—for example, in a case
claiming that a proposed acquisition was favorable to shareholders.
61. See infra section III.B.1 (identifying magnitude of Type I and Type II errors in
normal economic times).
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purposes of this discussion, 95%62). To pass the test, the observed marketadjusted price change on the day of the item of interest must be at least $1.96. As depicted in Figure 5, there is only a 2.5% chance that the other
ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and background noise had a net price impact this
negative. Thus, there is only a 2.5% chance that we would observe a
market-adjusted price change this negative if the item of interest in fact
had no negative impact on price: The Type I error rate is 2.5%.63 Observed
market-adjusted negative price changes more negative than this—in our
example, the observed change of −$2.00 or −2.00%—pass the test.
The Type II error rate—where the item of interest did in fact have a
negative impact on price but the observed market-adjusted price change on
the day it was announced failed the conﬁdence test—is a bit more complicated. The Type II error rate depends not only on the level of statistical
conﬁdence required by the test, again 95% for this discussion, but also on
the magnitude of the actual negative price impact of the item of interest and
the issuer’s idiosyncratic volatility as measured by its standard deviation.
To see how this works, modify our continuing example slightly.
Suppose, as depicted in Figure 6, that an item of interest in fact had a
−1.00% market-adjusted impact on the issuer’s stock price and that, as
before, the standard deviation of market-adjusted price changes for this
issuer was 1.00% over the measuring period. Recall again that the marketadjusted price change observed on the disclosure day is the combination of
the item of interest’s price impact and the net price impact of all the other
ﬁrm-speciﬁc bits of news and background noise on that day.64 The relevant
question is: What is the likelihood that the observed market-adjusted price
change on the disclosure day will be sufﬁciently negative to pass the 95%
conﬁdence standard, (i.e., more negative than −1.96%)? This will only
happen if the net impact of all the other bits of ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and back62. Cf. Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in Reference
Manual on Scientiﬁc Evidence 359, 381 (3d. ed. 2011) [hereinafter Manual on Scientiﬁc
Evidence] (“Traditionally, scientists adopt the 95% level of conﬁdence . . . . “); David H.
Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in Manual on Scientiﬁc
Evidence, supra, 211, 245 (noting 95% is conﬁdence level “most popular” in scientiﬁc
literature).
63. The standard methodology is to use a “two-tailed” test, which looks only at the
magnitude of the price change. The result is considered statistically signiﬁcant at the 95%
level if the observed price change is greater than 1.96 times the standard deviation,
whether positive or negative. The observed price change being statistically signiﬁcant and
negative implies that if the item of interest had no effect on price, there is no more than a
2.5% chance that we would observe a change this negative.
64. The expected value of the effect on share price of these other factors is zero, but
that only means that they are as likely to add to as to subtract from the negative effect on
share price of the item of interest. As a highly simpliﬁed example, suppose there is one
other piece of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information revealed to the market the same day. This other
bit of news is unrelated to the news items of interest and if it were the only piece of ﬁrmspeciﬁc information revealed that day, would result in a positive price change of +3%. The
observed market-adjusted change in price will be 2%, even if, as posited, the news item of
interest itself affected price by −1%.
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ground noise on that day is at least −0.96% (which, when combined with the
−1.00% impact of the item of interest, would in total be at least −1.96%).
As depicted in Figure 6, this will be the case only about 17% of the
time, or only about one time in six.65 Thus, one cannot necessarily infer
from an observed market-adjusted price change failing the test that it likely
did not affect price. Indeed, for an issuer with a standard deviation of 1%,
an item of interest with an actual impact on price of −1.00% will fail the
test most of the time.
FIGURE 6: DEMONSTRATION THAT WITH AN ITEM OF INTEREST HAVING
AN ACTUAL NEGATIVE IMPACT OF $1.00, THE OBSERVED MARKET PRICE WILL
BE NEGATIVE ENOUGH TO BE CONSIDERED STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT
ONLY ONE TIME IN SIX (A TYPE II ERROR RATE OF 83%)

The mean of the distribution of the net impact of background noise and firm-specific news
other than the item of interest will equal zero. So if the item of interest has a −$1.00 impact
on price, the mean of the distribution of possible observed market-adjusted prices would equal
$97.50. The observed market-adjusted price must be at or below $96.54 to be considered
statistically significant at the 95% level. The impact of firm-specific news other than the item
of interest will therefore need to be negative by $0.96 or more (0.96 standard deviations) for
the observed market-adjusted price to be at or below $96.54. This will occur only 17% of the
time which is about one time in six. Thus the Type II error rate for items of interest with a
negative price impact of −1.00%—the rate at which items of interest with this negative an
impact will fail the test— is 83%.

65. For a more detailed discussion of the general approach to calculating the
chances of this kind of error, see Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox & Ronald J. Gilson,
Idiosyncratic Risk During Economic Downturns: Implications for the Use of Event Studies
in Securities Litigation 7–11 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 453, 2013)
[hereinafter Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk], http://ssrn.com/abstract=2314058
[http://perma.cc/7K5A-NGS3] (expressing calculations mathematically).
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More generally, the odds of an item of interest that actually had a
negative effect on price passing a test based on any given level of
conﬁdence depends on the size of the actual effect relative to the standard deviation of past day-to-day market-adjusted price changes. Also, the
higher the required conﬁdence level, the lower the rate of false positives
(Type I errors) and the higher the rate of false negatives (Type II errors).
As we will see, each kind of error can have negative social consequences
when event studies are used in securities litigation. That assessment leads
to the matter of special concern here: Economic crisis-related idiosyncratic volatility spikes make the problem of Type I and Type II errors
signiﬁcantly worse.
1. The Magnitude of Type I and Type II Errors in Normal Times Using a
95% Conﬁdence Level. — Our analysis starts by identifying the magnitude
of Type I and Type II errors in normal times. This sets the baseline for
our consideration of the impact of crisis-related volatility spikes.
a. Type I Errors. — In normal economic times, it is conventionally
assumed that the same probability distribution generates the marketadjusted price changes on each of the approximately 250 trading days
during the typical one-year observation period prior to the item of
interest’s disclosure.66 Thus, the standard deviation of the observation
period’ s approximately 250 market-adjusted price changes is a fairly
precise estimate of the standard deviation of the probability distribution
generating the net price impact of background noise and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information other than the item of interest on the day of its announcement. Under these circumstances, with a 95% conﬁdence standard, the
Type I error for a test of whether the item of interest had a negative
impact on price is as calculated above: 2.5%.
b. Type II Errors. — Now consider what in normal times would be
the Type II error rate associated with using the 95% conﬁdence level if an
item of interest in fact negatively affects the price by 5%.67 Again, background noise and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information other than the item of interest will simultaneously affect the issuer’s market-adjusted price. Thus,
the observed market-adjusted price change in any given instance may
differ, one way or the other, from 5%. Type II error occurs when the
observed market-adjusted price change—the combination of the price
impact of the item of interest and these other impacts—is not sufficiently
66. A visual review of Figures 1 and 2, supra, provides an empirical veriﬁcation of the
reasonableness of the assumption. In these Figures, each moment’s measure of
idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of market-adjusted price changes over the
previous twelve months. In other words it is a day-by-day look back over the prior twelve
months. One can see that during normal times this measure stays quite steady from one
day to the next.
67. Securities lawyers often use 5% as a crude rule-of-thumb threshold percentage as
a starting point for determining how much income or assets need to be misreported to be
considered material. See infra note 122 and accompanying text (describing prevalence of
5% in securities litigation contexts).
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negative to pass the test of statistical signiﬁcance. The starting point is to
calculate how negative the market-adjusted price change accompanying
the item of interest’s announcement needs to be to pass the test, just as
was done in the example above concerning Type II error depicted in
Figure 6. In Figure 2 above, market-cap-weighted average ﬁrm-speciﬁc
volatility, as measured by variance, from the 1970s until the advent of the
ﬁnancial crisis, was in the range of 6% to 10% during noncrisis years, with
an average of approximately 8%. This annualized variance translates to a
daily standard deviation of 1.78%.68 Again, for the observed market-adjusted
price change to be considered statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level, the
observed market-adjusted price change must be at least as negative as
1.96 times the standard deviation—it must be −1.96 x 1.78% = −3.49%.
The Type II error question is then how likely it is that the observed
market-adjusted price be at least this negative when the actual price
impact of the item of interest is −5%. The observed price change will be
this negative unless the net impact of the other ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and
background noise that day is +1.51% or more (so that, when added to the
−5% impact of the item of interest, the combined impact is less negative
than −3.49%). These other factors would have a net impact of +1.51% or
more only about 20% of the time.69 This is the Type II error rate—the
68. Since our calculations are based on daily data, it is our annual variances that are
interpolated using the following mathematical formula: $0# ∑,),
%&+ /% . 252 ∗ $0#*/% (
where ∑,),
%&+ /% is the sum of the market-adjusted returns on each of the 252 trading days
each year, and thus the left-hand side is the annual variance of market-adjusted returns.
The equality ﬂows because the market-adjusted returns will be independent of one
another in an efficient market. A reader can back out the daily variance by dividing the
annualized numbers in Figure 2 by 252. The daily standard deviation is the square root of
the daily variance. Due to the nonlinearity of variance, this is not the exact ﬁgure that we
yield after marketcap weighting the standard deviations of the individual ﬁrms, but this
difference is relatively minor.
69. This calculation involves the distribution of possible observed values of the
market-adjusted price change if the actual market-adjusted price impact of the tested item
of news is −5%. The distribution of observed market-adjusted price changes accompanying
tested items of news with an actual impact of −5% will approximate a normal distribution
with a mean of −5% and a standard deviation equal to the standard error of 1.78%,
representing the effect, plus or minus, of the other ordinary bits of ﬁrm-speciﬁc
information that move the issuer’s share price around every day. Since the observed
change in prices will be considered statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level and have the
right sign only if it is a decrease of greater than −3.49%, the question becomes: What are
the chances that the observed change after imposition of the requirement will be at least
this negative? The required negative change, −3.49%, is 0.85 standard deviations above
−5%, and so, based on the normal distribution, there is then an 80.2% chance that the
observed market-adjusted change in price will be a decrease greater than 3.49% and hence
considered statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level in a two-tailed test. Thus, there is a
19.8% chance that the observed change will yield a false negative. In a related, more
technical paper, we discuss in greater detail the general approach to calculating Type II
errors. Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 65, at 7–11.
In fact, market-adjusted stock returns do not appear to converge exactly to a normal
distribution (they are “fatter” tailed, i.e., they exhibit more extreme returns than if they
followed a normal distribution). We use the normal distribution because it is used in
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likelihood that this item of interest, which actually negatively affected
price by 5%, would not be accompanied by a market-adjusted price
change sufficiently negative to be statistically signiﬁcant. In these circumstances, a securities fraud claim will fail despite the fact that the disclosure did in fact have a 5% impact on stock price.70
Discussion can now move to the impact of crisis-induced increases in
idiosyncratic volatility on event study methodology and hence on the
conduct of securities litigation.
2. Type I and II Errors in Periods of Crisis-Induced, High Idiosyncratic
Risk. — A spike in idiosyncratic volatility has two implications for Type I
and Type II errors. First, if the spike recently occurred and conventional
event study methodology is employed, the test of statistical signiﬁcance
that identiﬁes the size of a price change large enough to meet the 95%
conﬁdence level can drastically underestimate the actual extent of Type I
error. Put simply, the standard deviation used for determining the
statistical signiﬁcance of the price change will understate the real standard deviation because of the crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic
risk—that is, securities fraud claims will succeed when they would
otherwise have failed. While more advanced techniques address this
underestimation, they raise other problems.71 Second, more generally,
even where the cutoff for statistical signiﬁcance properly takes into
account the crisis-induced spike in idiosyncratic risk and is set at the
appropriate point to maintain the Type I error rate at 2.5%, a spike
nonetheless can result in a several-fold increase in Type II error—that is,
securities fraud claims will fail when they should have succeeded.
a. The Effect of a Recent Increase in Idiosyncratic Volatility. — Consider
the situation where there has recently been a large increase in
idiosyncratic volatility, as was the case in the fall of 2008 as the full
dimensions of the ﬁnancial crisis were just becoming apparent.72 This
virtually all event studies for testing statistical signiﬁcance. The points outlined above and
below are only strengthened if returns are “fat tailed” because, if returns are fat tailed for
a given level of Type I error, one must set an even more stringent cutoff for statistical
signiﬁcance than one would under the normal distribution, which would induce more
Type II errors.
70. A ﬁrst impression is that the likelihood of a mistake is too high to provide the
foundation for the litigation of securities fraud cases. While that assessment is beyond the
scope of our effort here, it is worth keeping in mind the alternative: two expert ﬁnancial
analysts offering nonempirically grounded opinions where the error term is likely both
greater and completely impossible to estimate with any precision.
71. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (explaining advanced Generalized
Auto Regressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model).
72. For example, during seven days in September 2008, Lehman Brothers failed and
the federal government effectively nationalized AIG. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Market Efficiency After the Financial Crisis: It’s Still a Matter of Information
Costs, 100 Va. L. Rev. 313, 375 (2014) (noting full effect of capital market crisis had not
been fully realized by dates of Lehman Brothers failure and federal government’s
intervention in AIG).
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special situation poses problems for the conventional strategy for testing
whether an item of interest in fact affected price. In particular, it
undermines the use of a one-year measuring period before the occurrence of the event in question as a proxy for the forces generating idiosyncratic volatility at the time the item of interest is announced.
The conventional event-study methodology assumes that the volatility in the company’s market-adjusted stock price at the time of the
announcement is the same as during the preceding one-year observation
period.73 In the special situation of a recent crisis-induced increase in
idiosyncratic volatility, this assumption fails radically, resulting in an insufﬁciently negative cutoff and securities fraud actions succeeding when
they should not.
b. Potential Understatement of Type I Errors. — In this special situation,
the standard deviation of market-adjusted price changes during the oneyear observation period will underestimate the daily net price ﬂuctuation
by the time of the item of interest’s announcement. This is because of
the sharp increase in idiosyncratic risk that accompanies each crisis.74
With the cutoff for what is considered statistically signiﬁcant then
incorrectly based on a standard deviation smaller than what actually
prevailed at the time of the event, more than 2.5% of the tested news
items that in fact had no effect on price will be accompanied by marketadjusted price changes that satisfy this erroneous cutoff. Thus, the Type I
error rate will be understated to the beneﬁt of plaintiffs in securities
fraud actions.
A hypothetical provides a sense of the extent of the understatement
of Type I errors. Assume that the standard deviation of ﬁrm-speciﬁc price
changes during the observation period was 1.5% (the standard deviation
for the average S&P 100 ﬁrm for the July 1, 2007, to June 30, 2008,
period). Assume as well that the idiosyncratic volatility had increased to
2.7% (the standard deviation for such a ﬁrm in the July 1, 2008, to June
30, 2009, period) and that the event of interest occurs early in this
second period. The observation period is thus July 1, 2007, to June 30,
2008. Using the conventional methodology (a one-year pre-event
estimation period), any observed market-adjusted price drop of 2.95%
(1.96 x 1.5%) or more on the date the item of interest is disclosed would
be statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level. But by the date of
disclosure the standard deviation of idiosyncratic volatility has risen to
2.7%. The result is that about 14% of the time, items of interest with no
effect on price will be accompanied by market-adjusted price changes

73. See supra section III.A.2 (describing conventional method of using standard
deviation of observation period’s approximately 250 market-adjusted price changes as
measure of the probability distribution generating the net price impact of background
noise and ﬁrm-speciﬁc information other than the item of interest).
74. See supra Part I (summarizing empirical ﬁndings).
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sufficiently negative to be statistically signiﬁcant.75 In effect, our event
study is comparing apples and oranges: the current higher volatility with
a cutoff based on the older lower volatility level. Thus, the Type I error rate
would be almost six times the supposed 2.5% level. As will be discussed in
section IV.B.2, liability clearly should not be imposed on an issuer in a
securities fraud claim where the misstatement in fact had no impact on
price. Yet, with a recent increase in idiosyncratic volatility of this sort,
using a conventionally designed event study to determine loss causation
would increase six-fold the likelihood of liability being incorrectly
imposed in such a situation.
c. Correcting for Understated Type I Errors and the Resulting Increase in
Type II Errors. — One approach to addressing the problem of increased
Type I error caused by the increase in idiosyncratic volatility after the
estimation period ends is to begin the estimation period only after the
idiosyncratic risk increases. Where the tested item of news occurs
relatively soon after the increase in volatility, however, an estimation
period beginning with the volatility increase and ending immediately
before the item of interest will be shorter, possibly much shorter, than
the conventional one-year period. This will result in less precise estimates
of the relationship between the issuer’s stock price and the ups and
downs of the market as a whole (i.e., the issuer’s β)76 and of the level of
idiosyncratic risk. These less precise estimates ameliorate Type I error,
but only by increasing Type II error.77
Another approach to addressing the conventional strategy’s
signiﬁcant understatement of Type I error when there is a recent increase in idiosyncratic volatility is to use a full one-year observation
period that ends before the tested item of news becomes public, but to
use more advanced econometrics that take into account the midstream
change in idiosyncratic volatility.78 The additional complexity of these
75. This percentage reﬂects that −2.95% is 1.09 times the actual standard deviation of
2.70%. Based on standard statistical tables for the normal distribution, 14% of all
outcomes are more negative than 1.09 standard deviations below the mean.
76. See Appendix, supra note 23, at 11 (showing how this will increase idiosyncratic
risk).
77. One way to counter this problem of an abbreviated observation period is to
extend the period forward beyond the date the tested item of news becomes public, but
omit from the sample the price change on that date to avoid having the event whose effect
the study is trying to determine inﬂuence the measure. The downside is that the volatility
induced by the tested item of news may seep into other days in the observation period,
thus again increasing Type II error.
78. One method for dealing with shifting volatility is to use a GARCH model, which
makes current volatility a function of past volatility and net-of-market returns. See
Appendix, supra note 23, at 15 (providing more detailed explanation and analysis using
GARCH). GARCH is used frequently in academic studies of stock price volatility. See, e.g.,
A. Corhay & A. Tourani Rad, Conditional Heteroskedasticity Adjusted Market Model and
an Event Study, 36 Q. Rev. Econ. & Fin. 529, 530 (1996) (applying GARCH in event study
of divestitures). However, its use in litigation remains relatively rare. Other possibly useful
methods ﬂow from the literature identifying structural breaks in the data. See generally,
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techniques makes them harder for a court, let alone a jury, to evaluate.
In particular, these models offer the expert performing the analysis
relatively wider scope for important choices—that is, choices that
importantly affect whether the securities fraud claim will succeed.79 In
such circumstances, it is predictable that the plaintiff’s and defendant’s
experts will disagree. The court may be ill-equipped to determine which
expert to believe, and a jury will likely be utterly confused by what is a
very sophisticated econometric debate.
d. The Effect of an Increase in Idiosyncratic Volatility More Generally. — If
disclosure of the item of interest occurs at a time when idiosyncratic risk
is sharply elevated by economic crisis, the Type II error rate for any
maximum acceptable rate of Type I error will be much higher than it
would be in normal times. While this problem begins as soon as there is
an increase in idiosyncratic risk, for expository simplicity, we will
disentangle it from the problem just discussed above by assuming that
idiosyncratic risk has remained stable for more than a year before the
item of interest occurs. This treatment controls for the mismatch
between volatility levels during the estimation period and at the time the
event occurs.
Higher idiosyncratic volatility during the estimation period results in
a larger standard deviation of the issuer’s past market-adjusted share
price changes and consequently, a larger standard deviation with which
to evaluate the price effect of the item of interest’s disclosure. As a result,
the cutoff for an observed price change to be considered statistically
signiﬁcant must be more negative. Thus, for any given maximum
acceptable level of Type I error, the observed change in market-adjusted
price accompanying the particular event must be more negative for the
change to be sufficiently negative to meet the required level of statistical
conﬁdence.80 Consequently, the chance that an actual negative price
effect of any given size will be accompanied by an observed price change
that meets this standard is reduced. In other words, the greater the
volatility, the greater the number of Type II errors for any given allowable
number of Type I errors.81 In essence, the same level of price effect is
harder to detect when more is going on in the background.82
e.g., Jushan Bai & Pierre Perron, Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple
Structural Breaks, 66 Econometrica 47 (1998).
79. For example, the expert must choose how many autoregressive terms to include
in GARCH or how to identify the structural break. See Corhay & Rad, supra note 78, at
531–32 (providing model for estimating structural break).
80. For a formal demonstration of this point, see Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic
Risk, supra note 65, at 7–11.
81. Id. at 11 (showing mathematically that “if the Type I error rate is maintained at
2.5%, the Type II error rate jumps in crisis times from 19.8% to 66%”).
82. See id. (“[I]n high volatility times resembling the 2008–09 ﬁnancial crisis, only a
bit more than one in three disclosures that actually affected an issuer’s price by 5% would
pass the test of being considered statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level, compared
with . . . [over] four out of ﬁve . . . in normal times.”).
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The spike in idiosyncratic risk accompanying the recent ﬁnancial
crisis provides a dramatic illustration of this point. Recall the hypothetical discussed above that considered the level of Type II errors in
normal times when an event in fact has a −5% impact on price.83 Now
consider an event with the same actual price impact of −5% but that
occurs during crisis times with a spike in idiosyncratic risk of the
magnitude observed during the recent ﬁnancial crisis.84 Then the market-adjusted price change needed to meet the 95% conﬁdence level
standard jumps from −3.49% to −6.33%. This implies an increase in Type
II error rate from 20% to 66%.85 So, in such high volatility times, about
only one in three items of interest whose disclosure in fact affects an
issuer’s share price by −5% would be accompanied by observed price
changes considered statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level, compared
with four out of ﬁve passing the test in normal times. More generally,
whatever the level of maximum allowable Type I errors and whatever the
actual impact of a misstatement on price, higher volatility results in a
higher level of Type II errors.86
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF CRISIS-INDUCED SPIKES IN IDIOSYNCRATIC
RISK
Crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk can have important implications for corporate and securities law both through their effect on
event studies and more generally. In this Part, we examine three
83. See supra section II.B.1.b (presenting hypothetical scenario).
84. For this example, we assume that the standard deviation increases from the
normal-times level of 1.78%, see supra note 68, to 3.23%, approximately equal to the daily
idiosyncratic volatility of the market cap-weighted average ﬁrm in the S&P 100 during the
peak of the ﬁnancial crisis.
85. Similarly to the calculations in supra note 69, this calculation involves the
distribution of possible observed values of the market-adjusted price changes if the actual
market-adjusted price impact of the corrective disclosure is −5%. The distribution of
observed market-adjusted price changes accompanying corrective disclosures with an
actual impact of −5% will approximate a normal distribution with a mean of −5% and a
standard deviation equal to the standard deviation of 3.23%, representing the effect, plus
or minus, of the ordinary bits of ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and background noise that
affects the issuer’s share price every day during this period of high volatility. Since the
observed change in prices will be considered statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level and
have the right sign only if it is a decrease of 6.33%, the question becomes: What are the
chances that the observed change will be of that magnitude? The required negative
change, −6.33%, is 0.41 standard deviations beyond −5%. Based on standard statistical
tables for the normal distribution, there is then only a 34% chance that the observed
change in market-adjusted prices will be a decrease of at least 6.33% and hence statistically
signiﬁcant at the 95% level. Thus, there is a 66% chance that the observed change will
yield a false negative. For a more detailed discussion of these points, see Fox, Fox &
Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 65, at 10–11.
86. Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 65, at 7–9 (“The greater SD
[standard deviation], for any given [actual impact on price], the greater the likelihood of
Type II error.”).
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examples: In section IV.A, establishing causation and materiality in fraudon-the-market securities class actions; in section IV.B, establishing
materiality in other securities law contexts; and in section IV.C, judicial
deference to board rejections of premium acquisition offers and the
substantive coercion defense.
A.

Fraud-on-the-Market Shareholder Class Actions: Establishing Causation
and Materiality

The spike in idiosyncratic risk that occurs during ﬁnancial crises
causes a very substantial decline in the usefulness of fraud-on-the-market
class actions in crisis times.87 These actions allow buyers in secondary
securities markets to recover from the issuer losses that they incurred by
purchasing at prices inﬂated by the issuer’s misstatements, without individual class members having to prove that they actually relied upon (or
even knew about) the misstatement giving rise to their claim.88 These
fraud-on-the-market actions, based on alleged violations of section 10(b)
of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder, currently produce the bulk of all the
damages paid out in settlements and judgments pursuant to private
litigation under the U.S. securities laws.89 Plaintiffs in these fraud-on-themarket actions depend on the reliability of event studies. Idiosyncraticrisk spikes diminish that reliability for studies conducted during
economic-crisis periods.
The centrality of securities fraud class actions dates to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson.90 Prior to that decision, courts
required each plaintiff to prove that a misrepresentation was “a substantial factor in determining the course of conduct which results in [the
87. A fraud-on-the-market action is an implied right of action for civil damages based
on a misstatement made in violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.
73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a--78pp (2012)), 15 U.S.C. §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2015), and 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), promulgated
thereunder. Rule 10b-5 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, . . . [t]o make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Any statement made by an issuer that is “reasonably calculated to
inﬂuence the investing public,” for example by being made to the media, satisﬁes Rule
10b-5’s requirement that it be “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security,” even
though neither the issuer nor its officials buy or sell shares themselves. SEC v. Tex. Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
88. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42, 250 (1988) (holding lower
courts may apply fraud-on-the-market presumption on rebuttable basis).
89. See Fox, Securities Class Actions, supra note 12, at 1176 & n.2 (citing interviews
with practitioners and quantitative data about initial complaints).
90. 485 U.S. 224.

2016]

IMPACT OF VOLATILITY SPIKES

363

recipient’s] loss.”91 Under this traditional, pre-Basic rule, securities fraud
class actions were extremely difficult to prosecute. Absent the aggregation of claims (and associated economies of scale in litigation costs)
that a class action allows, pursuing a securities fraud claim is infeasible
for all but the largest traders. But certiﬁcation of a shareholder class
action seeking money damages requires that common issues of fact and
law predominate,92 a requirement that cannot be met if each plaintiff
must individually prove reliance and causation.93
Basic fundamentally changed the manner in which causation could
be proved. Under its then-new “fraud-on-the-market” theory, a material
misstatement by an issuer whose shares trade in an efficient market is
expected to affect the issuer’s share price.94 The Court said that because
such misrepresentations will have an impact on the security’s price and
because all traders rely on the price, individual reliance can be presumed
rather than proven, thereby eliminating the need for proof of individual
reliance.95 This presumption makes class actions economically feasible,
with the concomitant large potential exposure to issuers. The result was
an enormous growth in securities fraud class action litigation.96
This is where event studies come in. They are the predominant way
that class action plaintiffs establish both the materiality of the misstatement and the causal link between that misstatement and their losses—
that the issuer’s misstatement in fact inﬂated the prices the plaintiffs paid
91. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d. Cir. 1965) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 546 (Am. Law Inst.
1938)).
92. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
93. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 (5th Cir. 1996) (“[A] fraud
class action cannot be certiﬁed when individual reliance will be an issue.”).
94. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 246–47 (endorsing presumption that “market price of
shares traded on well-developed markets reﬂects all publicly available information, and,
hence, any material misrepresentations”).
95. Id. at 247 (“Because most publicly available information is reﬂected in market
price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be
presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”).
96. In the ﬁve-year period beginning April 1988, shortly after the Supreme Court’s
decision in Basic, and ending March 1993, the total cash amount paid to settle federal class
actions alleging that issuer misstatements distorted share price was $2.5 billion. Vincent E.
O’Brien & Richard W. Hodges, A Study of Class Action Securities Fraud Cases 1988–1993
I-5 (1993) (unpublished study) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). By the early 2000s,
the total amount of such settlements had increased dramatically. Indeed, the value of
settlements paid from January 2005 through December 2007 (a period that includes the
three blockbuster cases of WorldCom, Enron, and Tyco), including the disclosed value of
any noncash components, totaled over $39.5 billion. Laarni T. Bulan, Ellen M. Ryan &
Laura E. Simmons, Cornerstone Research, Securities Class Action Settlements: 2014
Review and Analysis 3 ﬁg.2 (2015), http://securities.stanford.edu/research-reports/19962014/Settlements-Through-12-2014.pdf
[http://perma.cc/UAH6-SJPM].
This
ﬁgure
decreased to $9.2 billion for the three years beginning January 2012 and ending
December 2014. Id.
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for their shares.97 Absent crisis-induced increases in idiosyncratic
volatility, this methodology works reasonably well. But our ﬁnding of very
large spikes in idiosyncratic volatility at times of economic crisis shows
that it works less well during these periods, precisely the time when large
price movements in individual stocks are likely to give rise to an increase
in securities fraud actions. This reduced effectiveness of event studies
during such periods raises important issues, discussed below, concerning
both how courts should administer fraud-on-the-market suits in such
times and how these suits should ﬁt into the larger framework of
securities law enforcement.
1. Fraud-on-the-Market Actions and the Importance of the Misstatement’s
Effect on Price. — The ﬁrst step in understanding the issues raised by our
empirical results for fraud-on-the-market actions is to examine how such
an action works.
a. The Stripped-Down Model of Fraud-on-the-Market Litigation. —
Analyzed doctrinally, the legal issues in a fraud-on-the-market securities
action (assuming the plaintiff establishes at the outset a public misstatement made with scienter by an issuer whose shares trade in an efficient
market) are the materiality of the misstatement, loss causation, transaction causation, and damages.98 The litigation of such a claim can be
described in terms of the allocation, between the parties, of the burdens
of proof and persuasion on each of these issues at each stage of the
litigation and the allowable forms of evidence.99 For our purposes here,
however, these issues reduce to two: Did the misstatement inﬂate the
price paid by more than a de minimis amount, and if so, did the plaintiff
suffer a loss as a result?
Where both these questions can be answered affirmatively, all the
doctrinal elements for the cause of action will be satisﬁed.100 An investor
97. A recent article sympathetic to plaintiffs explains the conclusion that an event
study is mandatory for a securities class action case to proceed. See Michael J. Kaufman &
John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Fraud
Litigation, 15 Stan. J.L., Bus. & Fin. 183, 187 (2009) (“The interrelated questions of
materiality, reliance, loss causation, and damages all require an event study for their
resolution. The overriding substantive issue in securities fraud cases has become whether
an expert has proffered an opinion based on a reliable event study.”).
98. See, e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005) (“[T]he
action’s basic elements include: (1) a material misrepresentation (or omission); (2)
scienter . . . ; (3) a connection with the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance [or]
‘transaction causation’; (5) economic loss; and (6) ‘loss causation’ . . . .” (emphasis
omitted) (internal citations omitted)).
99. See id. at 342–43 (noting plaintiff must independently establish causation and
“an inﬂated purchase price will not itself constitute or proximately cause the relevant
economic loss” because of “tangle of factors affecting price”).
100. This observation parallels Daniel Fischel’s insight in a seminal pre-Basic article
that commented on lower court cases that were the origin of the fraud-on-the-market
cause of action. Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Securities Fraud
Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. Law. 1, 12–13 (1982). Fischel suggested
that the adoption of the cause of action reﬂected an underlying view of the market that
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who purchases shares of the issuer while the price is inﬂated by the
misstatement, and who still holds the shares at the time the truth is
revealed, has suffered a loss. She paid too much as a result of the misstatement, and because revelation of the truth dissipates this inﬂation,
she has not been able to recoup her loss by selling into a still-inﬂated
market. Her loss thus satisﬁes the loss causation requirement (with
transaction causation being satisﬁed as well by the mere fact that the
situation receives the fraud-on-the-market presumption).101 The amount
of this loss is her damages, thereby satisfying the damages
requirement.102 As for the materiality requirement, the Supreme Court
has held that a fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable investor would consider it important in a decision whether to
purchase or sell a security.103 Anytime a misstatement meaningfully
most investors were price takers. As a consequence, they are hurt by a misstatement
because of its effect on price, not its effect on their decisions to buy or sell. Fischel
observed that for an action based on this view, the traditional doctrinal issues of
materiality, reliance, and damages reduce to a single inquiry: Did the misstatement affect
price and if so by how much? Id. at 13. The Supreme Court cited Fischel’s article in Basic.
485 U.S. at 246 n.24.
For an example of a judicial opinion explicitly endorsing this collapsing of the three
traditionally separate doctrinal elements into a single empirical test, see In re Verifone
Sec. Litig., 784 F. Supp. 1471, 1479 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (noting fraud-on-the-market theory
“subsumes” reliance, materiality, causation, and damages inquiries into single analysis),
aff’d, 11 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 1993).
101. In the pre-fraud-on-the-market years before Basic, the courts reﬁned their
causation analysis to require two showings: transaction causation and loss causation.
Transaction causation required the plaintiff to show she would not have purchased but for
the misstatement. Loss causation required the plaintiff to show that the untruth was
responsible for the loss in some reasonably direct or proximate way. See Merritt B. Fox,
After Dura: Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Actions, 31 J. Corp. L. 829, 834–36 (2006)
[hereinafter Fox, After Dura] (discussing pre-Basic framework). These concepts do not ﬁt
well with the alternative causal connection allowed in the fraud-on-the-market actions, but
the courts have maintained the two requirements. Transaction causation is presumed in
any situation where the fraud-on-the-market presumption is allowed: where there is a
material misstatement by an issuer whose shares trade in an efficient market. See, e.g.,
Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165, 178–83 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] plaintiff in a
securities action is generally entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reliance if he or she
purchased or sold securities in an efficient market.”). A showing of loss causation requires
not only that the misstatement inﬂated the issuer’s share price but also that there was a
causal connection between this inﬂation and a loss by the plaintiff. Dura Pharm., 544 U.S.
at 346–48 (2005) (holding plaintiffs did not adequately allege “proximate causation and
economic loss”). Thus, the basic causal inquiry in the fraud-on-the-market theory is
framed in terms of loss causation.
102. This corresponds to the “out-of-pocket” measure of damages that is standard in
Rule 10b-5 cases. See Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1341–46 (9th
Cir. 1976) (Sneed, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part) (describing
out-of-pocket measure of damages and its application).
103. Basic, 485 U.S. at 232 (“We now expressly adopt the TSC Industries standard of
materiality for the § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 context.”). In TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., the Supreme Court found that a fact is material “if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” 426
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inﬂates the price of a security trading in an efficient market, it has
obviously had an actual effect on the behavior of investors. This strongly
suggests that a reasonable investor, like those actually trading in the
market, would have found it important.104
b. Focus on the Corrective Disclosure. — Where an issuer’s original
misstatement hides a truth that is less favorable than the market’ s
expectations for the issuer at the time the misstatement is made, the
misstatement will not increase the issuer’s share price. Instead, it just
avoids the share-price decline that would have resulted from the truth.
Because a substantial portion of all alleged issuer misstatements are of
this kind,105 the inquiry into materiality and causation usually focuses on
the market’ s reaction when the truth (the corrective disclosure) comes
out. If the announcement of the truth causes the price to decline, the
logic goes, the misstatement must have previously inﬂated the issuer’s
share price relative to what it would have been had the misstatement not
been made. And in an efficient market, the disclosure of the truth
guarantees that the inﬂation in the stock’s price has been dissipated.106
2. The Use of an Event Study to Establish that a Corrective Disclosure Has
Had a Negative Impact on Price. — Event studies are commonly used in
fraud-on-the-market suits for assessing the likelihood that a corrective

U.S. 438, 449 (1970). Materiality “does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that
disclosure of the omitted fact would have caused the reasonable investor to change his
vote.” Id. Rather, it contemplates “a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the
circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual signiﬁcance in the
deliberations of the reasonable shareholder.” Id. The Court went on to say, “Put another
way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would
have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having signiﬁcantly altered the ‘total mix’
of information available.” Id.
104. See, e.g., Teamsters Loc. 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier Inc., 546
F.3d 196, 207–08 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting “it is difficult to presume that the market will
integrate the release of material information about a security into its price” absent
evidence of efficient market for that security); In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261,
273–74 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting “‘reasonable investors’ are the market” and in efficient
market, information is reﬂected in price, so when information changes price, it must be
important to reasonable investors).
105. See, e.g., SEC v. Todd, 642 F.3d 1207, 1220–21 (9th Cir. 2011) (ﬁnding possible
“material misrepresentations” where issuer’s CEO “failed to publicly disclose in an
analysts’ conference call and an earnings press report that [issuer] Gateway’s ability to
meet analysts’ revenue growth expectations was based largely on . . . onetime . . . transactions”); Chamberlain v. Reddy Ice Holdings, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 2d 683,
702–04 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (noting plaintiff-shareholders pled materially false and
misleading statements with sufficient particularity by alleging issuer hid violation of
antitrust laws).
106. See Brealey, Myers & Allen, supra note 2, at 324–25 (summarizing “semistrong
market efficiency” hypothesis, according to which “prices reﬂect . . . all . . . public
information”).
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disclosure has in fact negatively affected price by more than a de minimis
amount.107
a. Event Studies as Evidence of Loss Causation and Materiality. — For
investors who purchase an issuer’s stock after the issuer’s misstatement
and still hold the stock at the time of the corrective disclosure, an event
study that reveals a statistically signiﬁcant, market-adjusted decline in
price when the truth is revealed provides evidence of both materiality
and loss causation.108 Indeed, some courts explicitly require the plaintiff
to present, through expert testimony, an event study in order to make a
showing of loss causation.109

107. See, e.g., In re Sadia, S.A. Sec. Litig., 95 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 806 (CCH) (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (“Vellrath conducted an event study of the daily movements in the price of Sadia’s
ADRs [before and after issuer’s fraud-related corrective disclosure] with the goal of
identifying any ‘abnormal returns’, i.e., returns greater than or less than . . . one would
expect on the security . . . .” (quoting Expert Report of Marc Vellrath, Ph.D., CFA, ¶41, In
re Sadia, S.A. Sec. Litig., 95 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. at 806 (No. 1:08-CV-09528 (SAS)), 2009 WL
5164437)); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 595 F. Supp. 2d 8, 22–24 (D.D.C. 2009)
(summarizing litigants’ use of event studies); In re Seagate Tech. II Sec. Litig., 843 F. Supp.
1341, 1368 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“Defendants’ expert . . . conducted the econometric ‘event
study’ by noting the movement of the price of [issuer] Seagate common for each day in
the class period and comparing it with an industry index.”); see also Kaufman &
Wunderlich, supra note 97, at 187 (arguing “properly conducted event study . . . has
become a substantive and essential element of a securities fraud claim itself”).
108. See, e.g., In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F. Supp. 2d 1202, 1266, 1275 (S.D.
Cal. 2010) (noting “plaintiff must show . . . economic loss occurred after the truth behind
the misrepresentation or omission became known to the market” and “decline in stock
price caused by the revelation . . . must be statistically signiﬁcant”); In re Imperial Credit
Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015–16 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (granting
defendant issuer’s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff failed to provide “event
study or similar analysis . . . [to] eliminate that portion of the price decline . . . which is
unrelated to the alleged wrong” and is instead attributable to “market events for which
Defendants cannot be held responsible”), aff’d sub nom. Mortensen v. Snavely, 145 F.
App’x 218 (9th Cir. 2005). Simply showing that the misstatement inﬂated price is not
sufficient to establish loss causation. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–46
(2005) (holding plaintiffs must prove proximate cause and economic loss caused by
misrepresentation).
109. See, e.g., Fener v. Operating Eng’rs Const. Indus. & Misc. Pension Fund (LOCAL
66), 579 F.3d 401, 409 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Although analyst reports and stock prices are
helpful in any inquiry, the testimony of an expert—along with some kind of analytical
research or event study—is required to show loss causation.”). Plaintiffs must generally
provide this evidence at the summary judgment stage. See Mary K. Warren & Sterling P.A.
Darling, Jr., The Expanding Role of Event Studies in Federal Securities Litigation, 6 No. 6
Sec. Litig. Rep. 19 (2009) (“[A]n event study is commonly the device that creates a triable
question of fact . . . .The presence or absence of an event study may, therefore, result in
summary judgment for the defendant or, in limited circumstances, the plaintiff.”). With
respect to materiality, see In re Gaming Lottery Sec. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶90,763, at 93,716, 93,716 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000) (event studies are “accepted method
for the evaluation of materiality”); William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory
Help Us Do Justice in a Time of Madness?, 54 Emory L.J. 843, 871, 874–83 (2005)
(collecting cases).
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Conforming to the usual social science convention,110 courts generally have adopted the 95% conﬁdence level as the standard to be used in
securities litigation for determining the price effect of a corrective disclosure.111 In choosing this standard, the courts are in essence establishing the plaintiff’s burden of persuasion concerning whether the
corrective disclosure in fact affected the issuer’s share price. The “null
hypothesis” is that the corrective disclosure had no negative inﬂuence on
price. If the plaintiff can persuade the fact-ﬁnder that the null hypothesis
can be rejected with at least 95% conﬁdence, the plaintiff has established
both loss causation and materiality.
b. The Working Assumption that the 95% Standard Maximizes Social
Welfare in Normal Times. — We will assume here that this adoption of the
95% standard in fraud-on-the-market suits is the correct, social-welfaremaximizing standard, at least in normal times.112 For our purposes, the
assumption that 95% is the correct standard in normal times forms a
useful baseline that conforms to current practice.113 This, in turn, allows
110. See Michael Cowles & Caroline Davis, On the Origins of the 0.05 Level of
Statistical Signiﬁcance, 37 Am. Psychol. 553, 553 (1982) (noting “conventional use of the
5% level as the maximum acceptable probability for determining statistical signiﬁcance” in
the social sciences and exploring convention’s origin); Kaye & Freedman, supra note 62, at
251 (“In practice, statistical analysts typically use levels of 5% and 1%. The 5% level is most
common in social science, and an analyst who speaks of signiﬁcant results without
specifying the threshold probably is using this ﬁgure.”).
111. See, e.g., United States v. Hatﬁeld, 795 F. Supp. 2d 219, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)
(recognizing, in criminal securities fraud case, “95% conﬁdence interval is the threshold
typically used by academic economists in their work”); In re REMEC Inc. Sec. Litig., 702 F.
Supp. 2d at 1266 (to establish loss causation, event study must show “decline in stock price
caused by the revelation of that truth [is] statistically signiﬁcant” (citations omitted));
Cornerstone Research, Estimating Recoverable Damages in Rule 10b-5 Securities Class
Actions 9 (2014), https://www.cornerstone.com/GetAttachment/df483ce3-5fe3-41b8-ad83-f
704dc8426f7/Estimating-Recoverable-Damages-in-Rule-10b-5-Securities-Class-Actions.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8ZR3-EYNK] (last visited Oct. 23, 2015) (“A conﬁdence interval of 95
percent is often applied in academic event studies and frequently accepted by courts.”).
Kaye & Freedman, supra note 62, at 251 n.101, note that the Supreme Court “implicitly”
endorsed the 95% conﬁdence level in two 1977 decisions. See also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977) (ﬁnding shortfall of black teachers hired by
defendant school district “signiﬁcant” because it represented “difference of more than
three standard deviations”); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 & n.17 (1977)
(ﬁnding sufficient “proof . . . to establish a prima facie case of discrimination
against . . . Mexican-Americans in . . . grand jury selection” where statistical evidence
showed the observed number of Mexican American jurors was less than expected number
by “greater than two or three standard deviations”). Kaye and Freedman point out that
“[a]lthough the Court did not say so,” the differences treated as “signiﬁcant” in Castaneda
and Hazelwood School District “produce p-values of about 5% and 0.3% when the statistic is
normally distributed.” Kaye & Freedman, supra note 62, at 251 n.101.
112. Although beyond the scope of this Article, this assumption is itself worthy of
further consideration. See, e.g., Leslie A. Demers, Lost in Transposition: Erroneous
Conﬂation of Statistical Certainty with Evidentiary Standards 3 (Feb. 27, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2225998 (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (describing errors courts make with 95% conﬁdence-interval standard).
113. See supra note 111 (listing cases that applied 95% conﬁdence-interval standard).
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a focus on the ultimate concern here: whether an economic crisisinduced spike in idiosyncratic risk changes the appropriate conﬁdenceinterval standard for event studies, regardless of what standard might be
optimal in normal times.
i. The Choice of Conﬁdence Level Sets the Terms of the Tradeoff Between
Type I and Type II Error. — An event study involves inevitable tradeoffs
between Type I error and Type II error, with the terms of this tradeoff
determined by the test’s chosen level of statistical conﬁdence.114 Recall
that if the 95% conﬁdence level is chosen, an event study will have a 2.5%
Type I error rate, i.e., there is a 2.5% chance that a corrective disclosure
that in fact has no effect on price will be accompanied by an observed
market-adjusted price change negative enough to pass the signiﬁcance
test (and allow the suit to go forward).
The choice of the 95% conﬁdence level also inﬂuences the Type II
error rate, i.e., the chance that a corrective disclosure that in fact has a
negative impact on price will be accompanied by an observed marketadjusted price that is insufficiently negative to meet the required conﬁdence level (and so will not allow a class action suit to go forward). But
an event study’s Type II error rate depends as well on how negative the
disclosure’s actual price impact is and on the level of idiosyncratic
volatility associated with the issuer’s stock. As we have seen, a corrective
disclosure with a −5% price impact made by an issuer with what, in
normal times, is the average level of idiosyncratic volatility, the choice of
the 95% conﬁdence level implies a Type II error rate of about 20%.
More generally, holding constant the level of idiosyncratic volatility,
the choice of the 95% conﬁdence level implies a Type I error rate of 2.5%
and a set of Type II error rates that correspond to the magnitude of a
corrective disclosure’s actual negative impact on price. The more negative the actual impact, the lower the Type II error. In comparison, a
conﬁdence level stricter than 95% would imply a lower Type I error rate
and a set of Type II error rates that, for each possible magnitude of
negative impact on price, would be higher than it would be with the
choice of the 95% conﬁdence level. A conﬁdence level less strict than the
95% level would have the opposite effects.
Thus, holding constant the level of idiosyncratic volatility, there is,
for any given negative impact on price, a tradeoff between Type I and
Type II error rates, with the point on this tradeoff determined by how
strict the chosen conﬁdence level is. Thus, the choice of the conﬁdence
level is the choice of a set of tradeoff points, each corresponding to a
particular magnitude of a corrective disclosure’s actual negative impact
on price. If idiosyncratic risk increases, the terms of this tradeoff worsen.
For a given chosen level of conﬁdence and Type I error rate, the Type II

114. See supra section III.B (deﬁning Type I and Type II errors and explaining
tradeoffs between them).
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error rate corresponding to any particular magnitude of a corrective
disclosure’s actual negative impact on price will be higher.
ii. The Social Welfare Effects of Type I and Type II Error and the
“Materiality Threshold.” — Assessing the social-welfare effects of these
tradeoffs between Type I and Type II error starts with understanding
both the social beneﬁts and social costs of imposing section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 liability on an issuer for making a misstatement that inﬂates
an issuer’s share price and how the extent of this distortion affects this
calculation. Forcing the issuer to pay damages in response to a fraud-onthe-market action helps deter other issuers from making such misstatements in the future. This penalty is the key private mechanism for
enforcing the Exchange Act’s comprehensive system of mandatory
disclosure applicable to publicly traded issuers—if the disclosure is not
accurate, damages are assessed.115 The improved share-price accuracy
and issuer transparency that result from greater compliance with this
disclosure system increase social welfare by enhancing the efficiency with
which resources are allocated in our economy.116
This gain does not come for free; securities litigation uses scarce
resources that could otherwise be deployed to other useful purposes.
These resources include the lawyers’ and experts’ time on both sides of
such litigation, as well as the time and effort expended by the issuer’s
executives and by the judiciary.117 The amount of resources consumed by
115. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement,
156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 229, 266–74 (2007) (detailing methods and results of private
enforcement).
116. Greater issuer transparency and more accurate prices in the secondary market
signal when an issuer’s management is doing a poor job of utilizing the ﬁrm’s current
assets and investing in new projects. Transparency and price accuracy help align the
interests of managers with those of shareholders by boosting the effectiveness of shareprice-based compensation, block-holder activism, and hostile-takeover mechanisms for
reducing the agency costs of management. Greater transparency, by reducing the
opportunities for insider trading, also adds to the value of an issuer’s shares by increasing
their liquidity. These points are discussed in more detail in Fox, Civil Liability, supra note
3, at 252–60, 264–67 (“By reducing the amount of nonpublic information . . . ongoing
periodic disclosure should therefore reduce bid/ask spreads, increase liquidity, and,
consequently, reduce the cost of capital.”).
117. A reasonable estimate of the litigation costs for the legal and expert fees of both
sides is $2.5 billion annually. See id. at 247 n.18 (“[T]his would suggest that the total
annual legal expenses associated with these actions averaged about $2.46 billion . . . .”).
This ﬁgure does not include the value of executive time devoted to defending the
litigation or much of the judicial resources consumed by such litigation. Nor does it
include the time and resources that honest executives devote to be sure that disclosures
that they believe to be true do not, despite the scienter requirement, generate liability
because of legal error. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Fraud on the Market: An Action
Without a Cause, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. PENNumbra 87, 94 (2011), https://www.law.
upenn.edu/journals/lawreview/articles/volume160/issue1/Rose160U.Pa.L.Rev.87(2011).
pdf [http://perma.cc/R5PU-MABT] (“[I]t is cheap and easy for corporate officers not to
lie, but to avoid being misjudged a liar, they may spend excessive corporate resources
scrubbing disclosures . . . .”). The ﬁgure also does not include efficiency losses from the
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such litigation is similar whether the original misstatement resulted in a
large or small price distortion. Thus, ideally, liability should be imposed
only in cases where, at the margin, the improvement in economic welfare
from deterring issuer misstatements is at least as great as the social costs
arising from prosecuting the action.118 This suggests, in turn, that there is
some degree of price distortion (as proxied by the size of the corrective
disclosure’s actual negative effect on price) below which price distorting
misstatements should not be subject to fraud-on-the-market damage
liability because the costs of the action would exceed the deterrence
achieved. We will call this point the “materiality threshold”—the point at
which the price distortion is large enough that deterring misstatements
that have so signiﬁcant an effect is worth the enforcement cost.119
iii. The Meaning of the Assumption that the 95% Conﬁdence Level Is
Socially Optimal in Normal Times. — With this understanding of the social
beneﬁts and social costs associated with imposing liability for
misstatements made with scienter and how they relate to the
misstatement’s actual effect on price, we can now explore the meaning of
the assumption that, at least in normal times, the 95% standard constitutes the socially optimal set of tradeoff points between Type I and
Type II errors.
Type I error—with its resulting imposition of liability where the
actual price impact of the corrective disclosure is zero—is the easy case:
It unambiguously reduces social welfare. Litigation is costly and there is
no gain in deterring misstatements so unimportant that their corrections
have no effect on price.
decision of managers, out of fear of such liability, not to voluntarily disclose true
information before disclosure is otherwise required.
118. This account of the potential social beneﬁts of fraud-on-the-market litigation does
not include providing compensation as a way of correcting for unfair investor losses or for
an inefficient allocation of risk if investor losses are left where they originally lie. These
compensatory rationales for imposing liability simply do not hold up under close
examination, a view widely shared by commentators on the issue. See, e.g., John C. Coffee,
Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation,
106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534, 1556–66 (2006) (arguing most compelling rationale for
imposing securities fraud liability is “impact of fraud on investor conﬁdence and thus the
cost of equity capital” throughout economy); Paul G. Mahoney, Precaution Costs and the
Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 Va. L. Rev. 623, 632 (1992) (“It is therefore not
surprising that Easterbrook and Fischel’s ‘net harm’ analysis reaches only tentative conclusions when applied to secondary-market frauds.”). The inadequacy of these
compensatory rationales is explored in detail in Fox, Securities Class Actions, supra note
12, at 1192–99 (concluding “investor protection arguments for imposing liability on an
issuer to deter misstatements are weak”).
119. What level the materiality threshold should be set at is subject to differences in
opinion. These differences arise from different assessments of a variety of factors: the
power of fraud-on-the-market suits to deter, the importance of ﬁnely accurate share prices,
and the total social costs of such litigation. The same differences in these assessments lead
to different views on the value of fraud-on-the-market suits as recently rehearsed in the
various opinions in the Supreme Court’s decision in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
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Assessing the welfare impact of Type II error is slightly more
complicated. Consider ﬁrst a misstatement whose actual impact on price
is greater than the materiality threshold. Type II error with respect to
whether its corrective disclosure had an actual negative effect on price
reduces social welfare because the error results in a failure to impose
liability in a situation where, by deﬁnition, imposing liability would have
been socially desirable: The improvement in economic welfare from the
issuer misstatements that would have been deterred would have been
greater than the social costs of the legal action necessary to impose
liability. For a misstatement whose actual impact on price is less than the
materiality threshold, however, the opposite is the case. Type II error, by
blocking imposition of liability in a situation where the social beneﬁts are
less than the social costs actually increases social welfare.
The social impact of the chosen level of statistical conﬁdence,
therefore, needs to account for three factors: the social harm from its
Type I error, the social harm from its Type II error with respect to the
corrective disclosures of misstatements having actual price impacts
greater than the materiality threshold, and the social gain (or social costs
avoided) from its Type II error with respect to the corrective disclosures
of misstatements having actual price impacts smaller than the materiality
threshold. Given these three factors, consider what is implied by the
assumption that the 95% conﬁdence level is socially optimal—that
making the conﬁdence standard stricter would reduce social welfare—in
normal times.120 That is, upon requiring a stricter conﬁdence level, the
social-welfare loss from the increase in Type II error with respect to
misstatements having price impacts greater than the materiality
threshold (factor 2) would exceed the combined social-welfare gain from
the decrease in Type I error (factor 1) and the increase in Type II error
with respect to misstatements having price impacts less than the
materiality threshold (factor 3). And it means that the net social-welfare
impact of making the standard less strict would also be negative: The
total losses from the increase in Type I error (factor 1) and from the
decrease in Type II error with respect to misstatements having price
impacts less than the materiality threshold (factor 3) would exceed the
gain from the decrease in Type II error with respect to misstatements
having price impacts greater than the materiality threshold (factor 2). If
95% is the socially optimal conﬁdence level, requiring either a stricter or
a laxer conﬁdence level reduces social welfare.
3. The Implications of Increased Idiosyncratic Risk for the Use of Event
Studies in Fraud-on-the-Market Suits. — As noted above, an increase in
idiosyncratic risk leads to a worsening of the terms of tradeoffs between
the Type I and Type II errors. Recall the example where the standard
error increases from 1.78%, which was the average standard deviation for
120. That is, assuming social welfare will be lower if the chosen conﬁdence level were
either stricter or less strict than 95%.
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the idiosyncratic volatility of the typical ﬁrm from the 1970s up until the
ﬁnancial crisis, to 3.23%, the average such standard deviation at the
height of the ﬁnancial crisis.121 Recall that the cutoff—the minimum
drop in the market-adjusted price that meets the 95% conﬁdence
standard—jumps from −3.5% in normal times to −6.33% in crisis times.
Maintaining the 95% standard during a crisis-driven high-volatility period
means that for corrective disclosures with an actual price impact of −5%,
the Type I error rate remains at 2.5%, but the Type II error rate more
than triples from about 20% to 66%. The consequences of this worsening
tradeoff for fraud-on-the-market litigation are dramatic: Liability would
be imposed in only about one case in three for misstatements whose
corrective disclosures have a −5% actual impact on price, compared with
four cases out of ﬁve in normal times.122
More generally, with idiosyncratic volatility for a ﬁrm’s stock at a
normal level, the choice of the conﬁdence level is the choice of a set of
points on the tradeoff between Type I and Type II error, each point
corresponding to a particular magnitude of a corrective disclosure’s
actual negative impact on price. If idiosyncratic risk increases, the terms
of this tradeoff worsen. So, for a given chosen level of conﬁdence and
hence given Type I error rate, the Type II error will be higher for any
given actual negative impact on price.
In the discussion that follows, we consider whether this sharp
worsening of the Type I/Type II error tradeoff in high-idiosyncraticvolatility times suggests needed changes of law or policy.
The discussion starts by exploring whether the apparent problem is
in fact self-correcting. Some kinds of corrective disclosures will cause
larger price drops during crises than normal times, thus keeping pace as

121. See supra section III.B.1.b (discussing example); supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing standard deviation at height of 2008 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis).
122. Here and elsewhere in our discussions of the effect of idiosyncratic risk on event
studies, we use a disclosure event with an actual impact on price of 5% as our example for
comparative calculations of Type II error rates in normal and in crisis times. Five percent
was chosen because a common rule of thumb used by securities lawyers is that information
relating to a change in net income of 5% or more is considered material. See United
States v. Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140, 1162 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[A] 5% numerical threshold is a
sensible starting place for assessing the materiality of [the alleged misstatements], but it
does not end the inquiry. Special factors might make a smaller miss [of reported ﬁnancial
performance] material.”), vacated in part on other grounds on reh’g en banc, 555 F.3d
1234 (10th Cir. 2009); see also SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45150,
45151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (stating SEC staff has no objection to registrants using this “rule of
thumb” in this fashion). A 5% decrease in the expected value of all future cash ﬂows,
discounted to present value at the discount implied in the market price before the
decrease in expectations, would, in an efficient market, result in a 5% decrease in price.
The policy-derived materiality threshold discussed here actually may well be above or
below 5% of net income but in the abstract, most people would agree that a misstatement
that causes a 5% change in stock price warrants attention.
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the cutoff for statistical signiﬁcance grows during crises. For these types
of disclosures, unambiguously no adjustment is needed.
The market’s reaction to other kinds of important corrective disclosures, however, will not grow in crises. Thus, we go on to address
directly the question of whether the worsened terms of the tradeoff
between Type I and Type II errors warrants reducing the required level of
statistical conﬁdence to something below 95%. In other words, would it
not make sense to accept a few more Type I errors to (partially)
counteract the rapid increase in Type II errors during crises?
While this idea has intuitive appeal, the discussion below shows that
the welfare effects are in fact ambiguous. In one knife-edge case,
reducing the conﬁdence level will improve welfare. In all other cases,
reducing the standard during crises will be helpful for some kinds of disclosures, but harmful for others, as compared to reducing the standard
during normal times. Because it is unclear whether moving down from
the 95% level will in fact be helpful in crises, we recommend a different
kind of solution. In high-idiosyncratic-volatility times, the 95% standard
should be maintained but, to compensate for the diminished effectiveness of private fraud-on-the-market type enforcement, reliance on,
and resources for, SEC enforcement actions should be increased.
a. Is the Problem with Increased Idiosyncratic Volatility Self-Correcting? — Is
it possible that the very event—economic crisis—that leads to the
increase in idiosyncratic volatility also renders it inconsequential in terms
of the worsening tradeoff between Type I and Type II error? The idea is
that the crisis raises not only the size of the negative price change necessary to be statistically signiﬁcant but also the size of the price drop from
any corrective disclosure. Such a magniﬁed impact is consistent with our
explanations of crisis-induced increased idiosyncratic volatility: current
news becoming more important relative to older news,123 news about the
quality of management becoming more important,124 and increased ignorance concerning what facts are relevant.125 To see this, suppose that any
one or more of these explanations is correct. Then corrective disclosures
with actual negative impacts on price that, in normal times, would usually
be accompanied by observed market-adjusted price changes sufficiently
negative to meet the normal-times cutoff for the 95% normal-times
conﬁdence level (−3.49% in our example126) will, in crisis times, have an
actual impact on price that is sufficiently more negative that their
accompanying observed market-adjusted price changes would be sufficiently negative to meet the 95% conﬁdence level’s more restrictive

123.
124.
125.
126.

See supra section II.A.
See supra section II.B.
See supra section II.C.
See supra section III.B.1.b (discussing Type II errors).
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economic-crisis-times cutoff (−6.33% in our example127). For such
misstatements, there is no need to worry about a policy response to the
worsening of the terms of tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors
because the corresponding magniﬁcation of the actual negative price
impacts of their corrective disclosures erases the effect.
While self-correction of this type will indeed help with regard to
certain misstatements, a problem remains. Recall that the most
convincing social beneﬁt from allowing fraud-on-the-market causes of
action is that they deter price-distorting misstatements and so enhance
allocative efficiency in the real economy.128 The absolute level of the
distortion and how it compares to what we call the materiality threshold
is what is important here, rather than how the distortion compares with
some elevated level of overall idiosyncratic price volatility.
There are two types of misstatements that in crisis times would move
prices enough to meet the materiality threshold, but that are not of a
nature where the self-correction described here would offset the crisiselevated cutoff for 95% statistical signiﬁcance. The ﬁrst is where the
misstatement’s actual impact on price in normal times meets the
materiality threshold129 but this impact is not magniﬁed by crisis. A
statement by an issuer that it holds assets, such as oil reserves, that in fact
do not exist is an example. The information-based explanations that we
ﬁnd most plausible for crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic volatility130
do not suggest that the actual price impact of such a misstatement would
be magniﬁed during crisis times, and so it would distort price no more in
crisis than in normal times.131 As a result, in crisis times, the price effect
of corrective disclosure would be signiﬁcantly less likely to meet the 95%
conﬁdence level’s more stringent crisis-period cutoff and so the Type II
error rate for this kind of statement will increase. The social beneﬁt from
deterring these kinds of misstatements, however, will still be as great as it
is in normal times.
127. See supra section III.B.2.d (discussing effect of increase in idiosyncratic
volatility).
128. See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (deﬁning “materiality threshold” as
degree of share-price distortion large enough that value of deterring misstatements
responsible for distortion exceeds social cost of fraud-on-the-market litigation required to
deter it).
130. See supra Part II (postulating explanations that current news becomes more
relevant during economic crises, information concerning quality of management becomes
more relevant during crises, or crises cause uncertainty as to what information is even
relevant to begin with).
131. Many disclosures will contain aspects that are “self-correcting” and others that are
not. For example, if a company misses its earnings target by $1 per share, this can be
thought of as two pieces of news: (a) shareholders have $1 less than they expected in assets
and (b) earnings may be on a lower trajectory in the future. We expect the reaction to (b)
to be ampliﬁed during the crisis but that part (a) will be evaluated the same way in both
regular and crisis periods.
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The second kind of misstatement where self-correction would not
suffice is the ﬂip side of the ﬁrst: a misstatement that, if made in normal
times, would not distort prices sufficiently to reach the materiality
threshold but if made in crisis times, is magniﬁed in its price impact
sufficiently to reach the materiality threshold. With this magniﬁed impact
on price, it becomes socially beneﬁcial to impose liability when it would
not be socially beneﬁcial in normal times. In crisis times, however, the
higher Type II error would reduce the likelihood that such misstatements
would trigger liability.
b. Does Increased Idiosyncratic Risk in Crisis Times Call for Reducing the
Standard of Statistical Signiﬁcance? — As we have just seen, for many
important kinds of misstatements, crises will radically increase the
number of Type II errors if we hold the number of Type I errors ﬁxed.
For the average ﬁrm, more than two-thirds of corrective disclosures
causing a 5% drop in the stock price would be missed if we keep the 95%
level during the most recent crisis. Even if, as we assume, the 95%
conﬁdence level is the socially optimal standard of statistical signiﬁcance
in normal times, maintaining the 95% standard during crisis times will
result in a large increase in Type II errors. In essence, the question is
whether any social gains from moderating the increase in Type II errors
would outweigh the social losses from the increase in Type I errors. As we
will see below, it is impossible to even make an educated guess as to the
answer. It is just as likely that reducing the standard in crisis times would
decrease social welfare as increase it.
The analysis makes three principal points:
1. To determine whether it would be desirable to relax the standard
below the 95% conﬁdence level in crisis times, the focus must be on
whether, at the margin, the welfare gains from reduced Type II errors are
greater when the standard is more relaxed in crisis times than in
ordinary times. This is because the corresponding increase in Type I
error will be the same in crisis times as in normal times and so the
resulting social losses will be the same.
2. Reducing the standard in crisis times will decrease Type II error by
more than doing so in normal times for corrective disclosures with actual
negative impacts on price greater than a particular magnitude (the
“crossover point”), but will decrease Type II error by less than doing so
in normal times where the actual negative price impact is less negative
than this crossover point.
3. Except in the unlikely event that this crossover point
coincidentally equals the materiality threshold,132 it will be very difficult
to tell whether the welfare gains from reduced Type II errors are greater
when the standard is relaxed in crisis times, compared to relaxing it in
ordinary times. This is because there will be a range of negative price
132. That is, the minimum size of price drops from corrective disclosures that it is
beneﬁcial to deter with liability.
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impacts where it is socially desirable to impose liability and where the
reduction in Type II error is greater when the standard is relaxed in crisis
times than in normal times. But there will also be a range of negative
price impacts either where it is socially desirable to impose liability and
the reduction in Type II error is instead less when the standard is relaxed
in crisis times than in normal times, or where it is socially undesirable to
impose liability and the reduction in Type II error is greater when the
standard is relaxed in crisis times than in normal times.
i. A Critical Question. — The assumption that the 95% conﬁdence
level is socially optimal in normal times means that, at the margin, the
social loss from a small relaxation in the standard, with the resulting tiny
increase in Type I error, just equals the social gain from the
corresponding decrease in Type II error. It also means that the social loss
from a more than inﬁnitesimal increase in Type I error must be greater
than the increase in social beneﬁts from the corresponding decrease in
Type II error. Hence, the assumption implies that in normal times there
would be no improvement from a meaningful relaxation of the conﬁdence standard. If an improvement were possible, the 95% standard
would not be optimal.
This analysis means that lowering the required conﬁdence level
below 95% can enhance welfare in crisis-induced, high-idiosyncraticvolatility times only if—contrary to normal times—the social gain from a
decrease in Type II error is greater than the social cost from the
corresponding increase in Type I error. Because the conﬁdence level is
deﬁned in terms of the acceptable level of Type I errors, lowering the
standard by a given amount in normal times and in high-idiosyncraticvolatility times results in the same increase in Type I error rate. So
lowering the conﬁdence level will have the same impact on Type I errors
and the same negative effect on social welfare in both crisis and normal
times.133 Thus, the critical question is whether, at the margin, reducing
the standard in crisis times will result in greater social welfare gains from
reduced Type II errors than reducing the standard in normal times would.
In sum:
1. Given the assumption that the 95% conﬁdence level is socially
optimal, if the level is relaxed in normal times, the social gain from the
reduced Type II errors at the margin just equals the social cost from the
increased Type I errors.
2. The social cost from the increased Type I errors if the standard is
relaxed in crisis times equals the social cost from the increased Type I
errors from relaxing the standard in normal times.
3. Thus, if the standard is relaxed in crisis times and the social gain
from the reduction in Type II errors is greater than if it is relaxed in
133. We are assuming, plausibly, that the costs and beneﬁts of imposing liability for
misstatements with any given price impact are the same in crisis and normal times.
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normal times, then the social gain from the reduction in Type II errors is
greater than the social cost from the increase in Type I errors. This would
mean that relaxing the standard in crisis times is a good thing to do.
ii. The Type II Error Effects from Reducing the Conﬁdence Level in Crisis
Times Versus Normal Times and the Crossover Point. — For corrective
disclosures with an actual negative impact on price greater than a
particular magnitude (the crossover point), reducing the required conﬁdence level from 95% to some lower level in crisis times will decrease
Type II error by more than doing so in normal times would. Where the
actual negative price impact is less negative than this crossover point,
however, doing so in crisis times will decrease Type II error by less than
doing so in normal times would. The discussion that follows summarizes
the reasoning as to why.134
The ﬁrst part of this proposition—relating to price impacts more
negative than the crossover point—would seem to make intuitive sense. A
crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic risk increases Type II error for any
level of price drop, so one would think that reducing the standard would
be more effective at reducing Type II error when there was more Type II
error to reduce. For the same reason, the second part of the
proposition—relating to price impacts less negative than the crossover
point—at ﬁrst seems counterintuitive.
An extreme example suggests why both parts of the proposition in
fact make sense. Imagine that in crisis times, the standard deviation of
the typical ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic volatility is 10%, whereas in normal times,
it is 1%. Now compare the reduction in Type II error from lowering the
conﬁdence level in normal times versus crisis times where the actual
negative price impact of the corrective disclosure is a large 20%. During
normal times Type II errors for this kind of disclosure are essentially
zero. This is because the net impact of other ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and
background noise on the day of the disclosure is almost never so positive
as to disguise the actual 20% drop: The assumed 1% normal-times
standard deviation of idiosyncratic risk tells us that the net impact of
these other items will rarely move the price more than a few percent. So
the Type II error rate with the 95% standard is almost zero. If the
standard is lowered to 90%, the Type II error rate will be even closer to
zero, but the reduction in Type II error from reducing the standard will
be very small.
In contrast, in crisis times, the standard deviation of 10% tells us that
the net impact of other ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and background noise will
move price much more relative to this 20% drop. The Type II error rate
with the 95% standard would be 48%, whereas if the standard were
relaxed to 90%, it would be 36%. Thus, for a corrective disclosure with a
large actual price effect, reducing the conﬁdence level results in a much
134. We have presented a rigorous proof of this proposition in a different paper. Fox,
Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 65, at 11–19.
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larger reduction in Type II error in crisis times than it would in normal
times.
Where the negative price impact of the corrective disclosure is a
much smaller 2%, the opposite will be the case. In normal times, the
standard deviation of 1% tells us that other ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and
background noise will move price much more relative to an actual 2%
negative price impact than to an actual 20% price impact. In this normal
period, the Type II error rate with the 95% standard would be 48% and
with the 90% standard it would be 36%. In contrast, in crisis times, an
actual negative price impact of 2% is a drop in the bucket compared to
the swings expected from the net impact of other ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and
background noise. Type II error thus will be very large whichever
conﬁdence level is used. The results of an event study would be
statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% level only if the observed marketadjusted price change was −19.6% or more, and statistically signiﬁcant at
the 90% level only if it was −16.4% or more. To pass these tests, the net
impact of other ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and background noise would have to
be at least −17.6% and −14.4%, respectively. The net impact of these
other items is slightly more likely to reach −14.4% or −17.6% or more
during a crisis, but the difference in likelihood is small. Speciﬁcally, the
Type II error with the 95% conﬁdence level standard would be 96%. With
a 90% conﬁdence level, the Type II error rate would be 92%. Thus, for a
corrective disclosure with a small actual price effect, reducing the
required conﬁdence level results in a much smaller reduction in Type II
error in crisis times than it would in normal times.
Keeping in mind this extreme example, consider a more realistic
example. Assume a corrective disclosure with an actual negative price
impact of 5%. Recall that the observed market-adjusted price change will
be the combination of this 5% drop and the net effect of the other bits of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and background noise that affect the issuer’s share
price the same day.135 The net impact of these other items is, on average,
zero. So the distribution of possible observed market-adjusted price
changes will be centered around −5%. How widely the returns are
dispersed around −5%, however, is a function of the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic
volatility: the higher the volatility, the wider the dispersion. Figure 7(a)
depicts two dispersions around −5% of possible observed market-adjusted
prices for the corrective disclosure in our example. The shallower curve
represents a standard deviation of 3.23%, the standard deviation of the
typical ﬁrm in the recent ﬁnancial crisis. The steeper curve represents a
standard deviation of 1.78%, the standard deviation of the typical ﬁrm in
normal times.

135. See supra section III.B & ﬁg. 6 (studying statistical causal link between factors
such as public ﬁrm-speciﬁc information and observed price change).
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FIGURE 7(A): WHEN THE CORRECTIVE DISCLOSURE CAUSES A 5% DROP
IN PRICE—COMPARING REGULAR AND VOLATILE PERIODS

FIGURE 7(B): 5% DROP—TYPE II ERROR USING 95% LEVEL IN
VOLATILE PERIODS

FIGURE 7(C): 5% DROP—TYPE II ERROR USING 95% LEVEL IN
NORMAL PERIODS
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FIGURE 7(D): 5% DROP—REDUCTION IN TYPE II ERROR MOVING TO
90% LEVEL IN VOLATILE PERIODS

FIGURE 7(E): 5% DROP—REDUCTION IN TYPE II ERROR MOVING TO
90% LEVEL IN REGULAR TIMES

FIGURE 7(F): 5% DROP—COMPARING REDUCTIONS IN
TYPE II ERROR MOVING TO 90% LEVEL

382

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:325

Now recall that the ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic volatility also determines how
negative the observed market-adjusted price change must be for it to be
considered statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level.136 The
cutoff is −1.96 multiplied by the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
risk of the ﬁrm. So for this typical ﬁrm, this cutoff in the ﬁnancial crisis
was −1.96 x 3.23 = −6.33% and in normal times would be −1.96 x 1.78=
−3.49%. Type II error—a corrective disclosure with an actual negative
impact on price that fails the test—occurs when the observed marketadjusted price change is not sufficiently negative to meet the cutoff.
Figures 7(b) and 7(c) display the Type II error rate using the
distributions from 7(a) and the crisis- and normal-period cutoffs, respectively: In the ﬁgures, any observed market-adjusted price to the right of
the applicable cutoff fails the test. For example, in Figure 7(b), because 5% is less negative than the 95% cutoff for crisis periods (−6.33%), the
corrective disclosure in our example will only pass the test if the net
impact of other bits of ﬁrm-speciﬁc news and background noise drives
the price down by at least another 1.33%. This is 0.41 standard deviations
below the distribution mean (which is −5%). For a normal distribution,
this will happen only about one-third of the time, so the observed price
will only be negative enough to pass the test about one-third of the time.
As a result, Type II error in crisis periods will be about 66% (i.e., the area
marked under the curve to the right of the cutoff in Figure 7(b) is 66%).
In contrast, as depicted in Figure 7(c), during normal times, the
observed market-adjusted price will pass the test unless the net impact of
these other items is sufficiently positive to drive the observed price up by
at least 1.51%. This is 0.84 standard deviations above the mean, which
with a normal distribution occurs only about 20% of the time (i.e., the
marked area in Figure 7(c) under the curve to the right of the cutoff
point is 20%). In normal times, then, Type II error would only be 20%.
Figures 7(d) and 7(e) graphically show what happens when we relax
the statistical standard to 90%. The cutoffs then drop to −5.30% (−1.64 x
3.23%) during crisis times and 2.92% (−1.64 x 1.78%) in normal times.
The area under the curves in these two ﬁgures between the 95% and 90%
thresholds represents the reduction in Type II errors. The area in Figure
7(d) is larger than in Figure 7(e), indicating that a corrective disclosure
with an actual negative impact on price of −5% is above the cutoff point:
Type II errors decline after reducing the required conﬁdence level by
more during crisis times than during regular times.
Figure 7(f) displays the same information as Figures 7(d) and 7(e),
except that we have transformed the two distributions so they can be
directly compared by turning them both into the standard normal
distribution, centered at zero and having a standard deviation of 1.137
136. See supra section III.B.1.b (mentioning relevance of ﬁrm-speciﬁc volatility on
observed price change).
137. The math, though a bit difficult, is not important here.
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Observe two things. First, this transformation preserves the standard
deviations we noted above, so that the threshold for 95% in crisis times
starts 0.41 standard deviations below the mean and the 95% threshold in
normal times starts 0.84 standard deviations above the mean. Second,
observe that the interval between the 95% and 90% cutoff is the same
length (.32) in both regular and crisis periods. This means comparing
the reduction in Type II errors is easy: Whichever period’s interval is
closer to zero (with a −5% actual impact, the crisis period) will see the
larger reduction in Type II errors, since the normal distribution is at its
highest at zero.
This approach, depicted in Figure 7(f), can be used to compare the
normal- versus crisis-period reduction in Type II error from reducing the
conﬁdence level for corrective disclosures with any magnitude of actual
negative impact on price. Figures 8(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) depict these
comparative reductions for actual negative impacts of 2%, 3%, 4.13%,
5%, and 6%, respectively. One can see from these ﬁgures that it will also
always be the case that the crisis interval falls to the left of the normaltimes interval (because the actual price impact relative to the standard
deviation is always less negative in crisis times). One can see from Figure
8(c) that the crossover point will be where the two intervals are mirror
images of each other, with the crisis-times interval on the negative side
and the normal-times interval on the positive side. In all these curves, the
distance under the curve from −1.96 to −1.64 (i.e., −0.32) is the same. For
actual impacts (Figures 8(d) and 8(e)) that are more negative than the
crossover point of −4.13%,138 the curve is higher over the interval
representing the reduction in a crisis period, representing a larger area
and hence a larger reduction in Type II error. For actual impacts below
the crossover point (Figures 8(a) and 8(b)), the opposite is the case.

138. The crossover point for relaxing the standard from the 95% conﬁdence level to
the 90% conﬁdence level (i.e., allowing up to 5% Type I error instead of only 2.5% Type I
error) when volatility increases for the typical company from a standard deviation of 1.78
to 3.23 (the normal times versus the ﬁnancial crisis) is −4.13%. For the calculations, see
Fox, Fox & Gilson, Idiosyncratic Risk, supra note 65, at 16–19.
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FIGURE 8(A): 2% DROP—SMALLER THAN CROSSOVER

FIGURE 8(B): 3% DROP—SMALLER THAN CROSSOVER

FIGURE 8(C): 4.13% DROP—CROSSOVER POINT
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FIGURE 8(D): 5% DROP—LARGER THAN CROSSOVER

FIGURE 8(E): 6% DROP—LARGER THAN CROSSOVER
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iii. The Special Case Where the Crossover Point Exactly Equals the
Materiality Threshold. — To assess the welfare impact of lowering the
conﬁdence level in crisis times, consider ﬁrst the special case where the
Type II error crossover point exactly equals the materiality threshold, as
depicted by the ﬁrst bar in Figure 9. In this special case, the impact on
Type II errors from reducing the required statistical conﬁdence would
have an unambiguously greater net positive effect on social welfare in a
period of crisis-induced high idiosyncratic risk than it would in normal
times. To see why, recall that it is socially desirable to impose liability on
misstatements made with scienter whose corrective disclosures have
actual price impacts more negative than the materiality threshold
because the social beneﬁts from the deterrent effects of imposing liability
exceed the litigation’s social costs.139 The converse would be true for
misstatements whose corrective disclosures have actual price impacts
smaller than the materiality threshold.
For all corrective disclosures with actual price impacts more negative
than the crossover point, reducing the conﬁdence level will decrease
false negatives more in high-idiosyncratic-volatility times than in normal
times. Where the crossover point just equals the materiality threshold,
this is exactly the range of price impacts where reducing false negatives is
welfare-enhancing. This is because it is desirable for liability to be
imposed where the corrective disclosure’s price impact is more negative
than the materiality threshold.
For all corrective disclosures with actual price impacts less negative
than the crossover point, lowering the conﬁdence level in highidiosyncratic-volatility times will decrease false negatives (Type II errors)
by less than in normal times. Reducing false negatives for corrective
disclosures with price impacts in this range is welfare-destroying because
it is undesirable to impose liability where the corrective disclosure’s price
impact is less negative than the materiality threshold. So less reduction in
false negatives is desirable because false negatives block imposition of
liability and imposing liability is not desirable for corrective disclosures
with actual negative price impacts this small.
Now we can put the two cases together. As depicted in the ﬁrst bar in
Figure 9, over the full range of possible actual negative price effects from
corrective disclosures, the impact on the Type II error rate from reducing
the conﬁdence level would increase social welfare in a period of high
idiosyncratic risk. Compared to normal times, reducing the conﬁdence
level in crisis times would reduce the Type II error rate by more in the
range where Type II errors are undesirable and reduce it by less in the
range where Type II errors are desirable. Therefore, in this special

139. See supra note 119 and accompanying text (explaining concept of “materiality
threshold” as point at which price distortion becomes large enough to justify enforcement
costs of deterring misstatements).
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situation, lowering the standard in volatile times would unambiguously
increase social welfare.
iv. The Ordinary Case Where the Crossover Point Does Not Equal the
Materiality Threshold. — The special case described above, where the
crossover point is exactly equal to the materiality threshold, would be
pure coincidence because the factors determining each are independent.
In the ordinary case, they would not be equal. As a result, the
comparative welfare effects of lowering the conﬁdence level in crisis
times versus doing so in normal times become more complicated. If the
crossover point is either more or less negative than the materiality
threshold, there will be a range of actual negative price effects from
corrective disclosures for which the impact on Type II errors from
lowering the standard in crisis times will have a less positive, or a more
negative, effect on social welfare than in normal times.
First consider the situation, depicted in the second bar in Figure 9,
where the crossover point is more negative than the materiality
threshold. In this situation, for corrective disclosures with actual price
impacts less negative than the crossover point but more negative than the
materiality threshold, reducing the standard in high-volatility crisis times
will reduce false negatives by less than doing so in normal times. This is a
range of actual price impacts where false negatives are undesirable. So
for corrective disclosures with price effects in this range, lowering the
standard in crisis times is, in terms of its impact on Type II errors, less
socially beneﬁcial than doing so in normal times.
Next consider the opposite situation, depicted by the third bar in
Figure 9, where the crossover point is less negative than the materiality
threshold. For corrective disclosures with actual price impacts more
negative than the crossover point but less negative than the materiality
threshold, lowering the conﬁdence standard in volatile times will reduce
false negatives by more than doing so in normal times. This is a range of
actual price impacts, however, where false negatives are desirable because
it is undesirable to impose liability. So for corrective disclosures with
price effects in this range, lowering the standard is, in terms of its impact
on Type II errors, more socially harmful than doing so in ordinary times.
Thus, in each of these two situations, for corrective disclosures with
price impacts in the range between the materiality threshold and the
crossover point, the welfare effects of reducing the conﬁdence level in
high-volatility crisis times would be less beneﬁcial, more harmful, than it
would be in normal times. For corrective disclosures that have actual
price effects that are on either side of this range, the welfare effects of
lowering the standard would be more favorable, or less unfavorable, in
crisis times than in normal times, for the same reasons as in the special
situation where the crossover point precisely equals the materiality
threshold.
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If, as seems likely, the crossover point does not equal the materiality
threshold—meaning there is a range of corrective disclosure price
impacts that fall between these two points—what can we conclude about
the social welfare effect of lowering the conﬁdence level during crisisinduced high idiosyncratic volatility times? Recall that the critical
question is whether the welfare beneﬁts from the reduction in Type II
errors are greater when the conﬁdence level is relaxed in crisis times
compared to ordinary times. Thus, we need to know whether the
enhanced level of welfare gains with respect to corrective disclosures with
price impacts outside this range on one side or the other dominate the
reduced level of welfare gains, or increased level of welfare losses, with
respect to corrective disclosures with price effects within this range.
Answering this question requires knowing two things. First, one must
know the distribution of misstatements in the economy in terms of their
price effects (and hence the price effects of their associated corrective
disclosures). And second, the answer also requires knowing, for
corrective disclosures with each such level of price impact, the social gain
or loss arising from weighing the deterrence beneﬁts from imposing
liability versus the costs of such litigation. We are currently far from
knowing either of these things.

2016]

IMPACT OF VOLATILITY SPIKES

389

FIGURE 9: TYPE II ERROR REDUCTION FROM REDUCING THE
CONFIDENCE LEVEL FOR STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE IN CRISIS TIMES VERSUS
NORMAL TIMES AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
For corrective disclosures with actual impacts more negative than the crossover point, reducing the
standard in crisis times will decrease Type II error by more than doing so in normal times would. For
corrective disclosures with actual impacts less negative than this point, reducing the standard in crisis times
will decrease Type II error by less than doing so in normal times would.
It is socially desirable to impose liability on misstatements made with scienter whose corrective
disclosures have actual price impacts more negative than the materiality threshold and socially undesirable
to impose liability for such misstatements when they have actual price impacts less negative than this point.
The comparative welfare effects of lowering the standard in normal versus volatile times is depicted
here with regard to three situations: (A) where the crossover point equals the materiality threshold, (B) where
the crossover point is less than the materiality threshold, and (C) where the crossover point is greater than
the materiality threshold.
(+) = The welfare gains from reduced Type II errors are greater, or the welfare
losses from reduced Type II errors are smaller, in crisis times than in normal times.
(-) = The welfare gains from reduced Type II errors are smaller, or the welfare
losses from reduced Type II errors are greater, in crisis times than in normal times.

390

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:325

v. Summary and Conclusion. — Whether the steep increase in Type II
errors during economic-crisis-induced periods of high idiosyncratic
volatility warrants reducing the conﬁdence level used in event studies of
corrective disclosures in order to determine loss causation and
materiality in fraud-on-the-market suits reduces to the following question:
At the margin, does lowering the conﬁdence level in crisis times increase
social welfare through the reduction of Type II errors more than doing
so in normal times does? This distillation follows logically from two
observations. First, the negative welfare effect from a relaxed conﬁdence
level’s increase in Type I errors will be the same in crisis times as in
normal times because, by deﬁnition, reducing the standard will increase
Type I error by the same amount in each of these two periods. Second, in
normal times, this negative welfare effect from a reduced conﬁdence
level’s increase in Type I errors will, at the margin, just equal the positive
welfare effect from the reduced conﬁdence level’s decrease in Type II
error because this is a necessary condition for our starting assumption
that in normal times the 95% standard results in the socially optimal set
of points in the tradeoffs between Type I and Type II errors.140 Thus,
reducing the conﬁdence level in crisis times is desirable only if the
resulting positive welfare effect from a reduced standard’s impact on
Type II errors is greater in volatile times than in normal times.
We have seen that it is impossible to determine, without considerably
more information than appears to be available, whether this condition is
met. The exception is the special—and purely coincidental—case where
the Type II error crossover point exactly equals the materiality threshold.
That case would be a pure coincidence because the factors determining
the crossover point are entirely independent of the factors determining
the materiality threshold.
The assumption that the 95% conﬁdence level is the socially optimal
point of tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors in normal times may,
of course, be incorrect.141 But that would simply suggest that the standard
be changed for normal times, an analysis that we do not undertake here
(though our discussion identiﬁes the nature of the inquiry). Regardless,
the results here are generalizable from any such altered set point. If the
optimal standard in normal times is something other than 95%, this
analysis still suggests that without more information than we now have,
we cannot have strong priors that welfare would be enhanced, rather
than compromised, by lowering the required standard of statistical
conﬁdence during periods of economic crisis.
c. Shifting the Mix of Enforcement Mechanisms in Crisis Times. — The
foregoing discussion shows that there are no simple answers to the
questions that arise from using event studies to assess materiality and loss
140. See supra notes 111–113 and accompanying text (explaining assumption that
95% is socially optimal conﬁdence level).
141. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (discussing assumption).
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causation in fraud-on-the-market class actions in the face of economic
crisis-induced increases in idiosyncratic volatility. We can say with
certainty, however, that the dramatic worsening in the tradeoff between
Type I and Type II errors makes the threat of fraud-on-the-market actions
a comparatively much less useful tool for deterring price-distorting issuer
misstatements in crisis times than in normal times. As has just been
demonstrated, there is as much reason to believe that lowering the
required conﬁdence level in times of economic crisis will decrease social
welfare as increase it. And if the required level of statistical conﬁdence is
maintained at 95%, the threat of such an action constitutes a
considerably less effective deterrent.
This loss of deterrence can be illustrated. Assume that if misstatements made with scienter distort prices by 5%, they surpass the materiality threshold, i.e., they are serious enough to incur the social costs of
deterring them through private actions. As we have seen from our
examples, crisis times would transform this useful cause of action from
one that catches most such misstatements—four out of ﬁve—to one that
catches many fewer—just one in three. And if the conﬁdence standard is
lowered to at least partially compensate for this loss in deterrence, a
fraud-on-the-market class action becomes a costlier way to deter issuer
misstatements because, among other reasons, of the corresponding
increase in Type I errors.
This very substantial decline in the usefulness of fraud-on-the-market
class actions in crisis times has not been previously recognized. It suggests
that during crisis times, more resources should be devoted to other
methods for deterring price-distorting misstatements, for example
stepped-up SEC enforcement actions. In contrast to fraud-on-the-market
suits, the SEC is not required to establish loss causation in Rule 10b-5
enforcement actions.142 So in a crisis, the SEC will not have to prove loss
causation in times when it is considerably less likely that the corrective
disclosure of a misstatement that substantially distorts price will be
accompanied by a statistically signiﬁcant, market-adjusted price drop.
The SEC still, of course, needs to establish that the misstatement was
material, but unlike with respect to loss causation, the case law permits
materiality to be proven other than through an event study.143 For
example, the SEC could show the facial importance of the issuer’s
misstatement, the extent to which analysts took note of the misstatement
at the time it was made, and any price reaction at the time of the
misstatement. Evidence that would suggest that the market-adjusted price
142. See, e.g., SEC v. Kelly, 765 F. Supp. 2d 301, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“[U]nlike a
private plaintiff, the SEC need not allege or prove reliance, causation, or damages in an
action under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5.”); supra notes 88–104 and accompanying text
(discussing requirements of fraud-on-the-market shareholder class actions).
143. See, e.g., SEC v. Lee, 720 F. Supp. 2d 305, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding SEC
sufficiently pleaded materiality by alleging defendant’s false statements would have
inﬂuenced reasonable investor).
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drop at the time of any unambiguous issuer announcement of the truth
might be smaller than the amount by which the misstatement inﬂated
price also would be relevant. Possible explanations of how this could
occur include insider trading based on the truth, rumors of the true
situation circulating in the market, and the existence of a series of
corporate announcements that dribbled the truth out in small doses in
advance of the full corrective disclosure. All of these could lead to the
market’s realizing the truth, often gradually, in advance of the full
corrective disclosure and thus cause a smaller or nonexistent observed
market-adjusted price change at the time of the disclosure.144
Using these other indicia to determine whether a misstatement
inﬂuenced price is a considerably more subjective exercise than the use
of an event study. Indeed much of the event study’s appeal for the
judiciary derives from its greater objectivity and transparency: Experts
may differ in their methodology, but in comparison to, for example, the
testimony of a ﬁnancial analyst, the differences between competing
methodologies are readily observable. This appeal is so important that in
private suits, some courts will grant the defendant summary judgment on
the issue of loss causation if the plaintiff does not introduce an event
study showing a statistically signiﬁcant, market-adjusted negative price
change at the time of the corrective disclosure.145 But when the event
study becomes a comparatively less powerful tool, alternative forms of
evidence concerning loss causation and materiality become relatively
more attractive. At least in theory, courts could give more importance to
these other forms of evidence in fraud-on-the-market suits as well as in
SEC enforcement actions in times of economic crisis.146 But it is likely
that they are relatively more manageable in the hands of an administrative agency that can use prosecutorial discretion in deciding which
cases to bring.

144. See Fox, After Dura, supra note 101, at 850–51 (explaining why share price does
not necessarily drop immediately after corrective disclosure); David Tabak & Frederick C.
Dunbar, Materiality and Magnitude: Event Studies in the Courtroom 7 (Nat’l Econ.
Research Assocs., Working Paper No. 34, 1999), www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/
publications/archive1/3841.pdf [http://perma.cc/KUK3-FFLF] (discussing beginning
event studies prior to actual announcement of news to correct for leakage before that time).
145. See, e.g., In re Imperial Credit Indus., Inc. Sec. Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 1005,
1014–16 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (ﬁnding defendants entitled to summary judgment because
plaintiffs failed to produce event study); In re Exec. Telecard, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 979 F. Supp.
1021, 1025–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (rejecting reliability of expert testimony due to failure to
perform event study).
146. For a view of one of the authors that as a general matter, some of these factors
should, under certain circumstances, be taken into account by courts in fraud-on-themarket actions, see Merritt B. Fox, Demystifying Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market
Actions, 60 Bus. Law. 507, 523–25 (2005). For an opposing view that they never should be,
see John C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject
Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 Bus. Law. 533, 537 (2005).
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Establishing Materiality in Other Securities Law Contexts

The concept of “materiality” pervades securities law, reaching far
beyond fraud-on-the-market suits. This includes two particularly
important areas where event studies are frequently used: insider trading
regulation and section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the Securities
Act) litigation based on alleged misstatements or omissions in the
registration statements of public securities offerings. Use of event studies
to establish materiality in each of these important areas raises sufficiently
distinct issues from their use in fraud-on-the-market studies to warrant
separate discussion.
1. Insider Trading. — One of the requirements of the longstanding
prohibition under Rule 10b-5 against insider trading is that the
information on which the insider trades be “material.”147 The doctrinal
standard for materiality in insider trading cases under Rule 10b-5 is
identical to that in Rule 10b-5 misstatement cases: whether there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider the
nonpublic information on which the insider traded to be important in a
decision whether to purchase or sell the security involved.148 If the later
public disclosure of this information changes the price of this security, it
has had an actual effect on the behavior of investors. Again, this change
in price strongly suggests that a reasonable investor would have found
the information important at the time that the defendant traded on it. As
in fraud-on-the-market cases, an event study is the ﬁnancial economist’s
standard tool for determining the likelihood that the disclosure of a
previously nonpublic item of news in fact did change the price of a
security. Not surprisingly, therefore, the courts in insider trading litigation have accepted event studies as at least one (preferred) way to
establish the materiality of information.149
The social gains from deterring trades based on inside information
are somewhat different from the gains from deterring corporate
misstatements, as are the costs from imposing liability for insider trading
where the importance of the information is below a certain threshold.
Still, there will be a point below which, if we knew for certain the impact
of the information on price, we would not wish to impose liability—i.e,
147. See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc) (“An insider’s duty . . . to abstain from dealing in his company’s securities arises
only in ‘those situations . . . which are reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the
market price of the security if . . . disclosed.’” (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities
Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur
Proceeding, 51 Va. L. Rev. 1271, 1289 (1965))).
148. See supra note 103 (explaining deﬁnition of materiality).
149. SEC v. Berlacher, No. 07-3800, 2010 WL 3566790, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2010)
(referring to “event study as reliable and the best measure of materiality”); see also Mark
L. Mitchell & Jeffry M. Netter, The Role of Financial Economics in Securities Fraud Cases:
Applications at the Securities and Exchange Commission, 49 Bus. Law. 545, 572–84 (1994)
(collecting cases).
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there is a policy-based materiality threshold. And because the tool that
we have to measure that impact—the event study—gives us only
probabilistic guidance as to what the actual impact of the information on
price was, the issues associated with the tradeoff between Type I and Type
II errors are the same as with fraud-on-the-market suits. If the same
required conﬁdence level is maintained during periods of economic
crisis-induced idiosyncratic risk as during normal times and if event
studies are required to establish materiality, Type II errors will rise
sharply and many more trades that in fact are based on information
sufficiently important to meet the materiality threshold will not be
actionable. But again, there are no strong reasons to believe that
lowering the required conﬁdence level, with the consequent increase in
Type I errors, will increase, rather than decrease, social welfare.
Ultimately, just as with fraud-on-the-market actions during periods of
crisis-induced spikes in volatility, event studies are a comparatively less
powerful tool in these circumstances for discriminating between
information that is and is not material in insider trading cases despite
their advantage of being less subjective. This makes our discussion of
alternative forms of evidence concerning proof of materiality in fraud-onthe-market class actions150 relevant to insider trading as well. Again, we
suspect that increased permissibility of more subjective kinds of evidence
during economic-crisis periods is more suitable in SEC enforcement
cases because its capacity to use prosecutorial discretion cabins their
inappropriate use in a fashion not present in cases brought by private
parties.151
The fact that event studies are, in crisis times, a comparatively less
powerful tool for discriminating between information that is and is not
material takes on special signiﬁcance in insider trading cases given our
explanations for what causes crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk.
These explanations suggest that more kinds of information that insiders
typically possess will be important in crisis times and will have a larger
effect on price when they are eventually revealed than they would in
normal times.152 This means that in crisis times, insiders would have
150. See supra section IV.A (examining causation and materiality in fraud-on-themarket shareholder class actions).
151. See supra section IV.A. In a nonjury trial involving an SEC Rule 10b-5 action
against a defendant accused of insider trading, at least one court has ruled that where the
defense has introduced expert testimony based on an event study showing no statistically
signiﬁcant price reaction upon the public release of the information on which the
defendant traded and the government, to show materiality, only offered the testimony of a
ﬁnancial expert who did not conduct an event study, the government failed to establish
materiality. Berlacher, 2010 WL 3566790, at *7. We note that this case did not involve a
situation where an economic crisis-induced spike in idiosyncratic risk devalued that
defendant’s use of an event study.
152. Recall from our earlier examples that the standard error for the typical ﬁrm
during the recent ﬁnancial crisis was 3.23%, compared to 1.78% in the average year in
normal times. Supra text accompanying note 121. This says, very roughly, that average bit
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many more opportunities to proﬁt from insider trading on nonpublic
information that in normal times would not be important enough to
warrant deterring by privately imposed liability or governmental
sanction. Yet assuming that the required level of statistical conﬁdence is
not changed, the very same larger standard error means that this larger
number of more important bits of inside information that are now
important enough to exceed the materiality threshold will on average be
no more likely to be found by an event study to be material than they
were in normal times when their price impacts were below this threshold.
2. Materiality Under Section 11 of the Securities Act. — Section 11(a) of
the Securities Act153 imposes liability on the issuer, the underwriters, and
certain other persons for misstatements and omissions of required
information in a registration statement for a public offering. As with
corporate misrepresentations and insider trading under Rule 10b-5, the
misstatement or omission is actionable only if it relates to a “material
fact.” The doctrinal standard for materiality is the same as under Rule
10b-5.154 Assume that following their issuance, the offered securities trade
in an efficient secondary market. If the registration statement contains a
misstatement or omission whose subsequent correction changes the
security’s price, the doctrinal standard would be met. As a result, here
too the courts have relied heavily on event studies in determining
whether the misstatement or omission was material.155
Assessing the appropriate role of event studies in determining
materiality and damages in section 11 cases and the implications of crisisinduced spikes in idiosyncratic risk requires a little background
concerning the system of liability and the statutory measure of damages,
including the allocation of burdens of proof and persuasion with respect
to these elements.
As for liability, section 11(a) imposes absolute liability on the
issuer.156 When an issuer offers equities for sale and makes a priceinﬂating misstatement or omission, it receives the inﬂated sales price.
Imposing liability simply returns the inﬂation to the buyer. At least in a
transaction-cost-free world (including the absence of judicial error),
doing so makes sense whatever the level of the issuer’s culpability, since
information released by such a ﬁrm had almost twice the effect on price in crisis as it did
in normal times.
153. Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codiﬁed as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa
(2012)).
154. See supra note 103 (explaining deﬁnition of materiality). The Supreme Court
has yet to address the proper standard for materiality under section 11 of the Securities
Act, but all the circuit courts that have addressed the question have applied the Northway
deﬁnition of materiality in section 11 actions. See, e.g., Kronfeld v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 832 F.2d 726, 731 (2d Cir. 1987) (collecting cases).
155. See, e.g., In re World Access, Inc. Sec. Litig., 310 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1298–99 (N.D.
Ga. 2004) (using parties’ event studies in determining materiality).
156. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Deutsche Bank Sec. Inc., 647 F.3d 479, 484 (2d Cir. 2011)
(applying section 11’s scheme of absolute liability for issuers).
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the net effect will be as if the offering was priced correctly in the ﬁrst
place. Imposing absolute liability also creates incentives to take costeffective steps to avoid such price distorting behavior.157
Now consider damages. For a plaintiff still holding her securities at
the time of judgment, section 11(e) provides that the prima facie
damages measure is the difference between the price paid for the
security and its value on the date of suit, with the difference presumed to
be caused by the misstatement or omission.158 But this crude measure
and presumption obviously does nothing to correct for market-wide or
ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors other than the misstatement or omission that may
have inﬂuenced the security’s price after the plaintiff’s purchase. To
address this gap, section 11(e) in effect shifts the burden of proving loss
causation from the plaintiff to the defendant by granting the defendant
an affirmative defense if it can prove the absence of loss causation;
damages are reduced to the extent that defendants can show that events
other than the misrepresentation or omission caused the price drop.
The implications of economic-crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic
volatility on determining materiality and damages/loss causation under
section 11 track those under Rule 10b-5. Each side will bear the burden
of proving statistical signiﬁcance with respect to the element on which it
bears the burden of proof. The plaintiff, if it seeks to prove materiality
through an event study, will succeed at doing so by showing a statistically
signiﬁcant drop in share price when the corrective disclosure was made.
157. Section 11(a) also imposes absolute liability on other participants in the process:
the issuer’s top managers, directors, and underwriters. However, section 11(b) grants these
other participants an affirmative defense: They have no liability if they can show that that
they engaged in adequate due diligence. 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), (b)(3). The overall liability
scheme for these other participants is designed to motivate each of them, particularly the
lead underwriter, to independently investigate the issuer and to participate actively in the
drafting of the registration statement. Commentary by persons intimately involved with
the creation of the Securities Act conﬁrm that this in terrorem arrangement for imposing
damages in the absence of adequate investigation was a critical part of the legislative plan
to promote full disclosure. See William O. Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal
Securities Act of 1933, 43 Yale L.J. 171, 173 (1933) (noting penalties are both
“compensatory” and “in terrorem” in nature and therefore are “set high to guarantee that
the risk of their invocation will be effective in assuring that the ‘truth about securities’ will
be told”); Felix Frankfurter, The Securities Act: II, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 54, 109 (praising
in terrorem effects of Act); see also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F.
Supp. 544, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (explaining courts must hold underwriters to high
standard of diligence “since they are supposed to assume an opposing posture with respect
to management”); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696–97 n.48
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (“The purpose of Section 11 is to protect investors . . . . In order to make
the underwriters’ participation in this enterprise of any value to the investors, the
underwriters must make some reasonable attempt to verify the data submitted to them.
They may not rely solely on the company’s officers or . . . counsel.”).
158. § 11(e), 48 Stat. at 83 (“The suit authorized under subsection (a) may be either
(1) to recover the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, less the
amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or (2) for
damages if the person suing no longer owns the security.”).
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In turn, the defendant will use an event study to prove that the drop in
security price was caused by events other than the corrective disclosure.
The fact that each party will likely contest the other’s event study further
complicates this event-study duel. Despite the complications, the analysis
remains essentially the same. If the same standard of statistical
signiﬁcance is maintained during highly volatile times as in normal ones,
Type II errors will rise sharply.159 Suppose the plaintiff is required to
establish materiality through use of an event study. Crisis times will
substantially diminish section 11’s capacity to create the situation that
would have prevailed if the offering had been priced correctly in the ﬁrst
place and to deter future price- distorting misstatements and omissions
in registration statements.
The crisis-induced increase in idiosyncratic volatility has the same
impact on the defendant’s effort to show that factors other than the
corrective disclosure caused all or part of the price drop. Thus, the
higher standard of statistical signiﬁcance will affect both the plaintiff and
the defendant. The relative impact will depend on the facts; the
defendant’s opportunity to disprove loss causation depends on the
presence of other events in the relevant period that may have affected
the issuer’s price. However, the limits on the capacity of event studies to
separate the effects of multiple factors make section 11’s shift in the
burden of proof to the defendant on this issue signiﬁcant.
C.

Judicial Deference to Board Rejections of Premium Acquisition Offers and
Substantive Coercion

To this point, our discussion of the legal implications of the pattern
of, and alternative explanations for, crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic
risk has focused on issues related to the content and their private and
public enforcement of the federal securities laws. We turn now to
corporate law and in particular to the legal implications of our ﬁndings
for what has been the most disputed element in state corporate law over
the last thirty years: the extent of judicial deference to a board of
directors’ decision to defend against a hostile takeover.160 Over this
159. Again, there are no strong reasons to believe that lowering the standard, with the
consequent increase in Type I errors, will increase social welfare.
160. See Jack B. Jacobs, Fifty Years of Corporate Law Evolution: A Delaware Judge’s
Retrospective, 5 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 141, 154–55 (2015) (arguing rise of hostile takeover
litigation contributed to changing legal standards for corporate boards). Justice Jack
Jacobs, a recently retired Delaware Supreme Court Justice who sat on the Chancery Court
during this period, described the matter as follows:
[The Delaware courts] created an entirely new . . . set of standards [for reviewing
boards of director’s actions] in the landmark cases of Unocal, Revlon, and
Blasius . . . [which] were needed to address new realities and issues arising out of
novel legal and ﬁnancial technologies, in order to solve the problem of whether
and how boards should respond to hostile corporate takeovers. That evolution
was game-changing. It reshaped the governance of boards and the conduct of all
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period, Delaware law evolved to give the board wide discretion when it
determines there is a risk of “substantive coercion”—a risk that the
shareholders may mistakenly accept a tender offer that the board
believes undervalues the corporation. As we will show in this section, the
concept of substantive coercion as developed by the Delaware Supreme
Court makes little sense in normal times. Here we consider whether
there is a circumstance in which the concept might make sense: Can
crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk of the sort discussed in Parts I
and II make a substantive coercion claim plausible where it would not be
credible in normal times? In particular, we examine two takeover cases
where an economic crisis ﬁgured centrally in both the bidder’s decision
to make the offer and the target board’s decision to oppose it: Air
Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.161 and Quickturn Design Systems,
Inc. v. Mentor Graphics, Inc.162
1. A Brief Review of the Evolution of Delaware Takeover Law. — The
emergence of the hostile takeover boom in the 1980s subjected
traditional corporate law to the equivalent of a stress test. The largest and
most tendentious corporate transactions in history created serious
doctrinal cracks, the most important of which was allocating, in the face
of a hostile tender offer, ﬁnal decision rights among directors, shareholders, and courts.163 As the law developed, the breadth of the board’s
discretion to constrain shareholders from approving a hostile offer came
to depend upon the court’s assessment of the board’s professed belief
that the offer presented a “threat” to corporate policy.164 An important
element of the potential threat was whether shareholders, even with full
information, would mistakenly (in the board’s view) tender their shares
to a hostile bidder. The threat that fully informed shareholders would
make this mistake is termed, awkwardly, “substantive coercion.”165
Framing the concept most generously, tolerance of board decisions
to block a hostile takeover depends in part on how accurately share
prices predict the value of the company in the incumbent management’s

Id.

players, including legal and ﬁnancial advisors, in the area of mergers and
acquisitions.

161. 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
162. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
163. Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art of Judging: William T. Allen, 22 Del. J. Corp. L.
914, 914 (1997).
164. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985)
(“[D]irectors must show that they had reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to
corporate policy and effectiveness existed because of another person’s stock ownership.”).
165. As will become apparent, one of the authors bears at least half the responsibility
for this very poorly turned phrase. See Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,
1384 (Del. 1995) (citing Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus.
Law. 247, 267 (1989) [hereinafter Gilson & Kraakman, Intermediate Standard], as origin
of term “substantive coercion”).
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hands. If these prices are thought to be relatively accurate, it is harder for
the target board to justify preventing its shareholders from deciding
themselves whether to accept a hostile offer made at a premium over that
price. The increase that we have documented in idiosyncratic risk during
times of economic distress provides, for the ﬁrst time, a potentially
coherent core to the concept of substantive coercion, a term that has
become progressively both more important to Delaware takeover law and
more empty of analytic content. Understanding this point, however,
requires a short detour along a very long road: the development of
Delaware’s takeover law.
The modern law of takeovers began with the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum.166 There the court resolved
the conﬂict between two contending positions over who could decide
whether a hostile takeover would succeed: Should the board be
prevented from interfering with the offer so that shareholders decide
whether to accept a hostile bid or should the board have the power to
prevent shareholders from making that choice?167 The Unocal court
rejected both contending positions in favor of creating for itself what
appeared to be a regulatory role: The court would decide whether the
hostile offer presented a threat and and if so, whether the board’s
response was proportional to the threat identiﬁed.168
Following Unocal, a law review article appeared that inﬂuenced the
further evolution of Delaware takeover law: Ronald Gilson and Reinier
Kraakman’s Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There
Substance to Proportionality Review?.169 Anticipating the possibility that the
Delaware Supreme Court might be too sympathetic to a board’s claim
that it knew better than the shareholders, the authors sought to provide
the court with a framework for responding to such claims in a way that
would cabin what would meet the test. From this effort came the awful
term “substantive coercion”: the risk that even in the face of full
disclosure, target shareholders still might mistakenly accept a hostile bid
that is lower than the company’s fundamental value.170 To make a claim
166. 493 A.2d 946.
167. Compare Gilson & Kraakman, Intermediate Standard, supra note 165, at 821,
831–48 (arguing conﬂict of interest inherent in management defensive tactics “exposes
the invalidity of defensive tactics in tender offers and delineates a general principle
governing management’s appropriate role in the tender offer process”), with Martin
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom, 35 Bus. Law. 101, 115–16 (1979)
(“There is no reason to remove the decision on a takeover from the reasonable business
judgment of the directors.”).
168. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (“If a defensive measure is to come within the ambit
of the business judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”).
169. Gilson & Kraakman, Intermediate Standard, supra note 165. Chancellor
Chandler assesses the article’s impact on Delaware takeover law in Air Prods. & Chems.,
Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 96–98 (Del. Ch. 2011) (citing article and noting adoption
of its proposed test into Delaware case law).
170. Gilson & Kraakman, Intermediate Standard, supra note 165, at 267.
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of substantive coercion credible, the authors would have required a good
deal more than just management’s predictable claim that the market
price undervalued the company’s shares. The board also would have to
state clearly the source of the mispricing and management’s plans for
correcting it.171 At the least, the discipline imposed by requiring this
showing would force management to specify the metric by which their

171. Id. at 268 (arguing substantive coercion allegation “requires a coherent
statement of management’s expectations about the future value of the company” and
“showing of how—and when—management expects a target’s shareholders to do better”).
Then–Vice Chancellor (now Chief Justice) Strine highlighted the problem that an
unconstrained claim of substantive coercion would present:
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that substantive coercion can be
invoked by a corporate board in almost every situation. There is virtually no CEO
in America who does not believe that the market is not valuing her company
properly. Moreover, one hopes that directors and officers can always say that they
know more about the company than the company’s stockholders—after all, they
are paid to know more. Thus, the threat that stockholders will be confused or
wrongly eschew management’s advice is omnipresent.
....
. . . Professors Gilson and Kraakman—from whom our courts adopted the
term substantive coercion—emphasized the need for close judicial scrutiny of
defensive measures supposedly adopted to address that threat[.]
Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293, 327, 329 (Del. Ch. 2000). Vice Chancellor Strine
then quotes Professors Gilson and Kraakman to show what “close judicial scrutiny” would
entail:
To support an allegation of substantive coercion, a meaningful proportionality
test requires a coherent statement of management’s expectations about the
future value of the company. From the perspective of shareholders, substantive
coercion is possible only if management plausibly expects to better the terms of
a hostile offer—whether by bargaining with the offeror, by securing a
competitive bid, or by managing the company better than the market expects.
To make such a claim requires more than the standard statement that a target’s
board and its advisers believe the hostile offer to be ‘grossly inadequate.’ In
particular, demonstrating the existence of a threat of substantive coercion
requires a showing of how—and when—management expects a target’s
shareholders to do better.
....
The discipline imposed by requiring management to state clearly just how it
intends to cause the price of the company’s shares to increase is a critical check
on knee-jerk resort to assertions that a hostile offer’s price is inadequate. For
example, if management believes that the price of a hostile offer is inadequate
because the market undervalues the company[ ] . . . an acceptable statement of
the threat to shareholders would require management to describe the steps that
it planned to correct the market’s valuation.
Id. at 329–30 (Del. Ch. 2000) (quoting Gilson & Kraakman, Defensive Tactics, supra note
169, at 268–69, 274).
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performance going forward should be measured if the offer were
defeated.
In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,172 the Delaware
“Supreme Court . . . addressed the concept of substantive coercion head
on . . . .”173 As that court put it in a subsequent case, the “board of
directors had reasonably determined that inadequate value was not the
only threat that Paramount’s all cash for all shares offer presented, but
was also reasonably concerned that the Time stockholders might tender
to Paramount in ignorance or based upon a mistaken belief, i.e., yield to
substantive coercion.”174
The result, it is fair to say, greatly diminished Unocal as a serious
restriction on a board’s authority to block a hostile takeover by turning
substantive coercion into an assumption rather than a standard of proof.
Possibly, the Delaware Supreme Court so sharply diluted the restrictions
on proving the presence of substantive coercion because neither the
court nor advocates of management discretion could articulate a
compelling circumstance when fully informed shareholders reasonably
could be expected to make a mistake in accepting a hostile offer. If so,
Gilson and Kraakman were too clever by half. In their effort to set the
standard of proof high, they created a situation where the Delaware
Supreme Court, to give the concept broad application, watered down
what had to be proved to essentially nothing.175
2. Substantive Coercion and Crisis-Induced Spikes in Idiosyncratic Risk. —
This is where the impact of crisis-induced spikes in idiosyncratic risk
comes in. The occurrence of such a spike may present a realistic situation
where substantive coercion could occur. In particular, recall our analysis
of the potential that the incidence of insider trading would go up as a
result of a crisis: The importance of new information about both the
company and about its management go up, which may increase the
amount and value of insiders’ private information compared to that
available to the market.176 This crisis-induced gap between management’s
172. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
173. Airgas, 16 A.3d at 98 (summarizing Delaware Supreme Court’s movement away
from Unocal in Paramount).
174. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995).
175. Chancellor Chandler reached just this conclusion in Airgas:
Inadequate price has become a form of ‘substantive coercion’ as that concept
has been developed by the Delaware Supreme Court in its takeover
jurisprudence. That is, the idea that Airgas’s stockholders will disbelieve the
board’s views on value (or in the case of merger arbitrageurs who may have
short-term proﬁt goals in mind, they may simply ignore the board’s
recommendations), and so they may mistakenly tender into an inadequately
priced offer. Substantive coercion has been clearly recognized by our Supreme
Court as a valid threat.
Airgas, 16 A.3d at 57.
176. See supra section IV.B.1 (arguing kinds of information typically held by insiders
are more important in crisis times than in normal times).
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information and that available to the market may be difficult to
communicate because of the crisis even if, unlike the insider trading
situation, management is inclined to close the gap through disclosure. In
a period when the continued validity of the market’s precrisis valuation
model of the company is in question and the range of relevant new
information expands precisely because of new competing models, simple
disclosure of management’s information may not solve the problem. In
this circumstance, the information gap may be a measure of substantive
coercion: For a period of time, management’s knowledge advantage over
shareholders concerning facts important for valuing the company is
signiﬁcantly increased. Thus, in a period of crisis when an increase in
management’s knowledge advantage is signaled by a spike in
idiosyncratic risk, there is, in the name of substantive coercion, a case for
temporarily giving the board more discretion to impede a takeover.
In this regard, consider the facts of two well-known takeover cases:
Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp.,177 and Air Products
and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc.178 Each case took place following a
ﬁnancial crisis. Each involved a sharp decline in the target’s share price,
which appears to have both prompted the bidder to initiate the hostile
offer and provided the target a rationale for resistance. As it turns out,
however, in each case, the timing of the crisis-induced increases in idiosyncratic risk do not support an application of the theory of substantive
coercion articulated above. This is because the crisis-induced spike in
idiosyncratic volatility had already dissipated by the time of the hostile
offer.
Quickturn was a technology company with whom Mentor Graphics
competed.179 Patent litigation brought by Quickturn had, by 1997,
resulted in an injunction barring Mentor Graphics from selling certain
products in the United States.180 There was an associated damages claim
by Quickturn that it said could reach $225 million.181 These developments led Mentor Graphics to consider a hostile acquisition of
Quickturn, motivated in large part by a desire to resolve the dispute by
extinguishing the claim through an acquisition of the company holding

177. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998), aff’g 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998).
178. 16 A.3d 48.
179. See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1283 (describing Mentor and Quickturn as publicly
traded companies on NASDAQ market specializing in electronic design technology and
emulation technology, respectively).
180. See id. at 1284–85 (“In December 1997, the [International Trade Commission]
issued a Permanent Exclusion Order prohibiting Mentor from importing, selling,
marketing, advertising, or soliciting in the United States . . . any of the emulation products
manufactured by [Mentor-acquisition] Meta outside the United States.”).
181. See id. at 1285 (“Quickturn is asserting a patent infringement damage claim that,
Quickturn contends, is worth approximately $225 million.”).
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the patent.182 There was, however, a problem over price. Although
Mentor Graphics’s investment banker supported the concept of the
acquisition, its view was that Quickturn’s stock price, which reached
$15.75 during the ﬁrst quarter of 1998, was too high to make the
acquisition worthwhile.
Things changed abruptly as a result of the Asian ﬁnancial crisis. By
summer 1998 (the second quarter), Quickturn’s stock price had dropped
to $6.183 Mentor Graphics’s chairman then concluded that “the market
outlook being very weak due to the Asian crisis made [the Quickturn
acquisition] a good opportunity.”184 Mentor Graphics then commenced a
tender offer at an approximately 50% premium to Quickturn’s crisisaffected market price, but at more than a 20% discount to the precrisis
price. In response, and after the requisite investment banking and legal
counsel opinions and board meeting discussion, Quickturn took a set of
defensive actions, including a delay in holding a shareholder-requested
meeting, an action the Chancery Court ultimately upheld. Quickturn also
adopted a “dead hand” poison pill185 that it withdrew after similar devices
were invalidated in cases involving other litigants and then a “slow hand”
poison pill that the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held violated
Delaware law.186
At least superﬁcially, this case presents a circumstance where a claim
of substantive coercion is plausible under the framework developed here.
If a crisis-induced spike in idiosyncratic risk is in fact occurring at the
time of the hostile offer, the spike would indicate that the private
information possessed by target management is likely of greater
signiﬁcance than it is in normal times. The market price of the target’s
shares, which did not reﬂect this private information, thus could more
signiﬁcantly diverge from a fully informed price—just the circumstance
182. Id. (“If Mentor owned Quickturn, it would also own the patents, and would be in
a position to ‘unenforce’ them by seeking to vacate Quickturn’s injunctive orders against
Mentor in the patent litigation.”).
183. Id. at 1284 n.5.
184. Id. at 1285 (quoting Mentor Graphics Executive Vice President Gregory
Hinckley).
185. A dead-hand poison pill is one that can be redeemed only by the directors who
adopted it or by successor directors nominated by directors who adopted it. See, e.g., id. at
1289 (describing “continuing director” provision in which only those directors could
redeem rights). If the adopting board is replaced, the pill will remain in place for its full,
typically ten-year term regardless of if the bidder wins a subsequent proxy contest.
186. See id. at 1289, 1292–93 (invalidating Quickturn’s “Delayed Redemption
Provision,” which prevented newly elected board members from redeeming rights within
six months if purpose of redemption was to transact with speciﬁed “interested persons”).
A slow hand pill imposes a period following a change in a majority of the board during
which the board cannot redeem the pill. The same device is sometimes referred to as a
“no-hand” pill. See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25, 27
& n.2 (Del. Ch. 1998) (“This case involves . . . a ‘no hand’ poison pill of limited duration
and scope . . . . Some practitioners of the art have described this iteration as a ‘slow hand’
poison pill.”), afford 721 A.2d 1281.
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contemplated by substantive coercion. Target shareholders who compare
this market price with the hostile bid could be misled into believing that
the bid presented an attractive premium when, judged against management’s difficult-to-communicate belief concerning the true value of the
shares, it did not. Thus, a spike in idiosyncratic risk could provide
evidence of the existence of the kind of situation that Gilson and
Kraakman contemplated: one where shareholders could be misled and
one where subsequent events—whether share price recovered—could
prove whether shareholders were in fact misled.187
The problem with this nice story is that the facts do not support it.
Recall from Figure 1 that for the typical issuer during the ﬁnancial crisis,
the pattern of idiosyncratic volatility over time in fact had a spike shape: a
rapidly increasing level of idiosyncratic risk followed in approximately
one year by a rapid return to precrisis volatility levels. As shown in Figure
10, this is exactly what happened to Quickturn. The company’s daily
idiosyncratic risk did rise abruptly during the summer of 1997, when the
Asian ﬁnancial crisis surfaced. Although increasingly volatile, its stock
price continued a general rise until a peak in the ﬁrst quarter of 1998,
only to collapse following its disappointing second quarter 1998 earnings
release.188 Mentor’s offer followed this collapse in price. By this time,
however, Quickturn’s idiosyncratic risk had returned to precrisis levels.
Thus, there is no simple link between a crisis-induced spike in
idiosyncratic risk and a story that Quickturn’s management had a particularly large, difficult-to-communicate, knowledge advantage at the time
the offer was made.

187. Gilson & Kraakman, Defensive Tactics, supra note 169, at 271.
188. This release reported an 11% drop in revenue from the year-earlier quarter and a
quarterly loss of between $0.12 and $0.14 per share, compared with a proﬁt of $0.04 a year
earlier.
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FIGURE 10: QUICKTURN IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK
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Airgas presents a similar fact pattern, albeit in the context of a
different crisis. Prior to the 2008 to 2009 ﬁnancial crisis, Airgas stock
traded in the $40s and $50s with some periods in the $60s. With the
onset of the ﬁnancial crisis, the stock dropped—in March 2009 as low as
$27—but recovered to the low $40s by the time of Air Products’s hostile
offer. Just as with Quickturn, Air Products had considered a hostile tender
offer prior to the crisis, “but did not pursue a transaction at that time
because Airgas’s stock price was too high. Then the global recession hit,
and in the spring or summer of 2009, Air Products’ interest in Airgas was
reignited.”189 Following unsuccessful discussions between the two companies, Air Products then made a hostile offer at $62, at a time when the
Airgas share price was still well below its precrisis level.190
There followed a series of improvements in the price of the Air
Products offer, culminating in a ﬁnal offer of $70. A proxy ﬁght led to
three Air Product nominees being elected minority Airgas directors, but
189. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 62–63 (Del. Ch. 2011).
190. The court quotes the CEO of Air Products as stating:
[N]ow is the time to acquire Flashback [the code name for Airgas]—their
business has yet to recover, the pricing window is favorable, and our ability
(should we so choose) to offer an all-cash deal would be viewed very favorably in
this market. To take advantage of the situation, we believe we will have to go
public with our intentions.
Id. at 68.
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surprisingly, the Air Products nominees then concluded that the $70
offer proffered by their nominator was inadequate. In a related case, the
Delaware Supreme Court prevented Air Products from accelerating an
election that likely would have resulted in Air Products nominees
constituting a majority of the Airgas board. The case then came back to
the Chancery Court with the central issue being whether the Airgas
board could decline to redeem its poison pill, in light of the fact that the
pill had “given Airgas more time than any litigated poison pill in
Delaware history—enough time to show stockholders four quarters of
improving ﬁnancial results, demonstrating that Airgas is on track to meet
its projected goals.”191
Chancellor Chandler made quite clear that in his view substantive
coercion should not, as a policy matter, be treated as a valid rationale for
declining to redeem the pill when the hostile offer had already been
delayed for over a year and there was no serious claim that the
shareholders lacked any necessary information. Nonetheless, he felt
constrained by Delaware Supreme Court precedent and concluded that
Airgas had met the Supreme Court’s empty standard for substantive
coercion.
Like Quickturn, the timing in Airgas makes it difficult to link a crisisrelated spike in idiosyncratic volatility to the potential for real substantive
coercion. In this respect, the data falsiﬁes the claim that a crisis-induced
increase in idiosyncratic volatility might cause shareholders to err in
whether to accept the hostile bid because the board possessed an
unusually great knowledge advantage over the market. As in Quickturn,
Figure 11 shows that the increase in Airgas’s idiosyncratic risk preceded
the Air Products offer, by which time risk levels had returned to normal
levels.192 This drop in idiosyncratic risk before the Air Products offer and
the further delay in the offer as a result of the litigation, suggests that
whatever potential there would have been for a successful substantive
coercion claim if the offer had been made earlier, Chancellor Chandler’s
instincts were right. Such a claim was no longer appropriate by the time
of the Air Products offer and certainly not by the time the court issued its
opinion.

191. Id. at 57.
192. Airgas’s idiosyncratic risk increased again after Air Products made its offer. This
presumably represents uncertainty for a considerable period of time concerning how high
Air Products was willing to go and concerning the legal wrangling related to the offer.
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FIGURE 11: AIRGAS IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK
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CONCLUSION
Financial economics and associated econometric techniques have
come to play a central role in corporate and securities law. This is hardly
surprising since at its core, ﬁnancial economics is concerned with the
valuation of ﬁnancial assets and at their core, corporate and securities
law are concerned with establishing rules that facilitate value
maximization. Both corporate law and securities law, in turn, depend on
the relationship between market prices and value in formulating causes
of action. In this Article, we for the ﬁrst time document and seek to
explain a pattern that existing theory does not predict and existing
empirical studies do not reveal: A spike in companies’ unsystematic risk
has followed every economic crisis from the 1929 stock market crash to
the 2008 to 2009 Great Recession. We consider the implications of this
pattern for securities law issues, including the proof and measurement of
the elements of a cause of action for securities fraud and insider trading
claims and for a central corporate law issue—the extent to which a target
board of directors can prevent shareholders from accepting a hostile
takeover. More generally we show the workings of what is not widely
recognized as a tautology: Law and ﬁnance cannot operate independently since one seeks to explain the factors that dictate the value of
ﬁnancial assets and the other seeks to establish rules and institutions that
facilitate creating that value.
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